




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OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

FORMAL CONSOLIDATED SUBMISSION

South Africa's International-Law Standards, the African Charter, and the Mthwakazi Question

Request for parliamentary oversight and a reasoned statement of the legal distinction

Reference	MRP/SA-IL/2026/01
Date	20 August 2026
Submitted by	Mqondisi Moyo, President, Mthwakazi Republic Party
Primary recipient	Portfolio Committee on International Relations and Cooperation, National Assembly
For attention	Hon. Supra O. R. Mahumapelo, MP, Chairperson; Mr Lubabalo Sigwela, Committee Secretary

Submission and acknowledgment contacts: Lubabalo Sigwela, Committee Secretary — lsigwela@parliament.gov.za | 021 403 3808 | 083 709 8508; Parliament general correspondence — info@parliament.gov.za

Copy for information and legal attention: Office of the Chief State Law Adviser (International Law), Department of International Relations and Cooperation

CONSOLIDATION NOTICE


This submission consolidates the legal questions raised in three prior letters to South African leadership dated 6, 11 and 12 August 2026, together with the separate Written Questions on the Doctrine of Inherited Borders issued on 10 August 2026 and addressed inter alia to DIRCO, African Union and SADC channels. No further serial correspondence on the same questions is intended pending a response or material development. The Mthwakazi Republic Party respectfully requests one considered institutional response to the consolidated record and written acknowledgment of receipt.

The MRP would welcome an opportunity to make an oral presentation to the Committee if invited.



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1. Executive submission

This is not a request that Parliament recognise an independent Mthwakazi. It is a request that the Portfolio Committee exercise its oversight function by requiring the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) to state the legal test South Africa applies to claims of peoples' self-determination, and to identify the legally relevant distinction that explains the Republic's different positions.

The question is narrow. South Africa has asked the International Court of Justice to treat self-determination as an inalienable right, has relied expressly on Article 20(1) of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, and has characterized the right as peremptory and erga omnes. In the Chagos proceedings, South Africa also pleaded that decolonisation cannot be realised without self-determination. At the same time, South Africa pleaded the contrary limiting principle of uti possidetis: inherited boundaries should ordinarily survive decolonisation. Those positions can coexist, but their application depends on a legal test that has not yet been stated to the MRP.

The MRP does not plead estoppel. South Africa remains free to distinguish Mthwakazi from Palestine, Chagos, Western Sahara, Somaliland or any other case. Different facts may properly produce different legal outcomes. The submission asks for the rule that produces those outcomes. A different conclusion is not the problem; an unstated legal distinction is.

QUESTION PRESENTED

What legally relevant criteria does the Republic of South Africa apply when determining whether a community constitutes a "people" entitled to self-determination under Article 20 of the African Charter; how does South Africa apply those criteria to the Matabele/Mthwakazi claim; and, if Article 20 is engaged, what form of self-determination does South Africa consider legally available within the constraints of sovereignty and territorial integrity?

2. Israel non-adoption and legal-accuracy clause

LIMITED USE OF SOUTH AFRICA v. ISRAEL

The MRP does not adopt South Africa's factual allegations against Israel and does not use Gaza as a factual or evidentiary analogue. The present Article 20/self-determination case rests on Zimbabwean facts, the African Charter, African Commission jurisprudence and South Africa's own self-determination pleadings in the Chagos and Palestine advisory proceedings. South Africa v. Israel is cited only to characterize accurately the Court's 26 January 2024 provisional-measures Order.

Nor does this submission state that the ICJ has found Israel responsible for genocide. The Court's 26 January 2024 Order concerned provisional measures and plausible rights; it did not finally determine the merits.


3. Why this submission is properly before the Portfolio Committee

Parliament describes portfolio committees as bodies that monitor and oversee national government departments, hold them accountable, consider international treaties and matters of public interest, and receive petitions, representations and submissions from the public. The



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present submission concerns the consistency and articulation of DIRCO's international-law positions and therefore falls naturally within the Committee's oversight function.

Parliament of South Africa, "Role of Parliamentary Committees" and current Portfolio Committee contact page. [Parliament source](#)

Current committee page: Portfolio Committee on International Relations and Cooperation. [Committee page](#)

The MRP does not ask the Committee to adjudicate sovereignty. It asks the Committee to obtain a reasoned governmental position on a question of South African foreign-policy doctrine that the Republic has itself placed before international courts and African institutions.

4. Prior engagement: the record now consolidated


The record preceding this submission consists of three letters to South African leadership dated 6, 11 and 12 August 2026, together with a distinct written-questions instrument issued on 10 August 2026 and addressed inter alia to DIRCO. They are not repeated here as fresh demands; they form the procedural and diplomatic record that makes consolidation appropriate. A1 is the strongest receipt evidence in that record: the delivered copy bears a physical DIRCO receipt stamp dated 6 August 2026.

Annex	Date	Instrument	Title	Function in present record
A1	6 August 2026	Letter to President Cyril Ramaphosa and Minister Ronald Lamola	South Africa's Selective Principles, Mthwakazi Self-Determination, and Afrophobia	Placed selective application of international-law, self-determination, accountability and Afrophobia arguments before the Presidency and DIRCO. The delivered copy bears a DIRCO receipt stamp dated 6 August 2026.
A2	10 August 2026	Written Questions addressed inter alia to DIRCO	Written Questions on the Doctrine of Inherited Borders	Expressly stated that recognition was not sought; requested the legal test governing inherited borders, consent, prior territorial status and the relevance of State conduct.



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
Annex	Date	Instrument	Title	Function in present record
A3	11 August 2026	Letter to President Cyril Ramaphosa and Minister Ronald Lamola	South Africa Wrote the Rule — Now Apply It to Mthwakazi	Applied Pretoria's published restoration/secession distinction and requested a reasoned response rather than recognition. Email transmittal documented 11 August 2026 to multiple DIRCO and Presidency addresses; a contemporaneous external copy with original headers is preserved and available on request.
A4	12 August 2026	Supplemental letter to President Cyril Ramaphosa and Minister Ronald Lamola	South Africa's Own Pleadings Before the International Court of Justice, and Their Application in Southern Africa	Placed South Africa's Chagos and Palestine ICJ pleadings, including the adverse uti possidetis passages, directly on the record and asked South Africa to state the peoplehood and self-determination test it applies. Email transmittal is documented on 12 August 2026 at 14:10:47 UTC to DIRCO, the Presidency, African Union Chairperson channels and the SADC registry. The message was copied contemporaneously to an external recipient outside the MRP; a copy retaining the original message headers is preserved and available on request.

Requested procedural treatment. The MRP requests written acknowledgment of receipt of this consolidated submission, confirmation that it has been placed before the Committee, and notification of any decision to request a written or oral response from DIRCO. Related public commentary on the consistency question has been published. This submission does not rely on that commentary as legal authority. No standalone transmission record for A2 is presently included; however, A4 was transmitted on 12 August to AU Chairperson channels and the SADC registry and expressly identifies the 10 August Written Questions. That independently places the existence and subject of A2 before those regional channels, while not proving that A2 itself was transmitted on 10 August.



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5. South Africa's own legal record

The record below is drawn from South Africa's own public pleadings, constitutional text and official governmental material. None is presented as an admission that determines the Mthwakazi claim. The point is narrower: these are standards, distinctions and constitutional concepts that South Africa itself has placed in its public legal record.


5.1 South Africa's ICJ positions

Proposition / short excerpt	Primary locator	Question created	Status
Universality <i>"a right of all peoples in the world"</i>	South Africa, Palestine Written Statement, 25 Jul 2023, para. 9 [P2]	South Africa framed self-determination expressly in universal terms. The wording does not identify the relevant "people" or dictate a remedy; it makes the requested legal test harder to confine to a single dispute.	South Africa's pleaded characterization
Content of self-determination <i>"freely determine their political status"</i>	South Africa, Palestine Written Statement, para. 47 [P2]	South Africa described political status, government without interference, and economic, social and cultural development. The inquiry is therefore broader than the binary question of secession.	South Africa's pleaded position
Uti possidetis / inherited borders <i>"boundaries should remain as they were"</i>	South Africa, Chagos Written Statement, para. 75 [P1]	Substantial adverse authority. It must be read in the Chagos decolonisation setting and confronted rather than treated as irrelevant to the historical-incorporation question.	Adverse position
Self-determination and decolonisation <i>"Without self-determination, decolonization cannot be realized."</i>	South Africa, Chagos Written Statement, para. 60 [P1]	This proposition does not assume that Mthwakazi is a decolonisation case. The prior question is whether the historical incorporation and decolonisation history is legally capable of engaging the principle and, if so, by what classification and criteria.	Conditional pleaded position
Self-determination and territorial integrity <i>"goes hand in hand"</i>	South Africa, Chagos Written Statement, paras. 64–65 [P1]	In the Chagos decolonisation context, South Africa linked self-determination and territorial integrity and discussed internal and external realization. This does not create a general right to external independence.	Context-specific pleaded position



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Proposition / short excerpt	Primary locator	Question created	Status
Political / domestic characterization <i>"political implications, domestic matters or contentious issues"</i>	South Africa, Chagos Written Statement, para. 55 [P1]	In that ICJ advisory proceeding, South Africa did not regard political or domestic dimensions, by themselves, as depriving the advisory question of its legal character. This does not create jurisdiction or a governmental duty to engage every political claim.	Jurisdictional position in Chagos only
Agreement exception <i>"one exception"</i>	South Africa, Chagos Written Statement, para. 76 [P1]	The paragraph concerns inter-State agreement. It does not create a Mthwakazi exception, but makes consent and legal transition relevant questions within South Africa's own Chagos reasoning.	Limiting position
African Charter Article 20 <i>South Africa relied on Article 20(1) as strengthening authority.</i>	South Africa, Palestine Written Statement, para. 48 [P2]	Article 20 is part of South Africa's own ICJ argument; peoplehood, territorial integrity and remedy remain separate questions.	South Africa's pleaded position
Status of the right <i>"a peremptory or jus cogens norm"</i>	South Africa, Palestine Written Statement, para. 51 [P2]	South Africa also characterized the right as erga omnes. That characterization does not itself identify the relevant "people" or dictate the available remedy.	South Africa's pleaded characterization

5.2 South Africa's constitutional and governmental treatment of community self-determination

The limitations come first. Section 235 concerns communities within the Republic of South Africa. It does not confer a particular political status, does not establish a right to secession, and is not invoked as a source of rights for Mthwakazi. Its full operative sentence is deliberately reproduced rather than abbreviated: "The right of the South African people as a whole to self-determination, as manifested in this Constitution, does not preclude, within the framework of this right, recognition of the notion of the right of self-determination of any community sharing a common cultural and language heritage, within a territorial entity in the Republic or in any other way, determined by national legislation." [P17]


The domestic-law distinctions also matter. Section 231(4) governs when an international agreement becomes law in the Republic; section 232 addresses customary international law; and section 233 is an interpretive rule requiring a reasonable interpretation of legislation consistent with international law where available [P17]. The MRP does not suggest that section 232 domesticates Article 20, that section 233 incorporates every international-law proposition into legislation, or that South Africa's ICJ pleadings themselves become domestic law.

The provenance is stated openly. South Africa's historical Initial Report under Article 62 of the African Charter, prepared from 1990s governmental material and still hosted by the Department of Justice, records that the Charter had not been enacted into South African law by national legislation; in its Article 20 discussion it reproduces section 235 and records the Volkstaat Council's mandate concerning self-determination generally and a possible Afrikaner Volkstaat



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[P18]. The MRP neither endorses the Volkstaat project nor its objectives and does not present that history as a precedent for Mthwakazi.

The narrow proposition is therefore textual and institutional: South Africa's Constitution recognizes the notion of community self-determination within its own constitutional framework. A Parliamentary Communications media statement reporting public hearings on 8 December 2022 also records that, after the Cape Independence Party raised self-determination, "the department" invoked section 235 and stated that communities may pursue self-determination "in line with the collective right" [P19]. That media statement is not treated as a transcript or formal legal opinion, and the unidentified department is not upgraded into a named agency.

6. The consistency requirement is one of explanation, not preclusion

6.1 Somaliland: DIRCO has already stated and applied a public distinction

On 29 December 2025, the United Nations Assistant Secretary-General for the Middle East, Asia and the Pacific recorded to the Security Council that on 26 December Prime Minister Netanyahu had announced Israel's official recognition of Somaliland as an independent and sovereign state [P12]. On the same 29 December, DIRCO publicly stated a legal-policy distinction rather than merely announcing an outcome: "We distinguish unequivocally between decolonisation and secession. The former restores sovereignty; the latter dismantles it." DIRCO then applied that distinction against recognition of Somaliland and invoked *uti possidetis* and inherited borders [P11].

Why this matters. Somaliland is different from the ICJ examples in one important procedural respect: MRP does not have to infer South Africa's test from counsel's pleadings. DIRCO itself demonstrated that, when it chooses, it can state a rule, identify the category into which it places a claim, and publish the legal-policy consequence. The Committee is being asked to obtain the same discipline for Mthwakazi: state the test, state the classification, and give the legally relevant reason.

Primary sources: DIRCO, "South Africa reaffirms commitment to Somalia's sovereignty and regional stability," 29 December 2025 [P11]; United Nations DPPA, Assistant Secretary-General Khaled Khiari, remarks to the Security Council on Israel's recognition of Somaliland, 29 December 2025 [P12].

6.2 South Africa's SADC leadership sequence, November 2025–August 2026


South Africa's current SADC leadership role predates the August 2026 Summit. At the Extraordinary Summit on 7 November 2025, SADC appointed South Africa Interim Chair until August 2026 after Madagascar relinquished the chair [P28]. On 12 August 2026, South Africa formally assumed the chairship of the SADC Council of Ministers for August 2026–August 2027 [P27].

DIRCO's published transcript from the 12 August Council meeting states that South Africa's first chairship priority is peace, security and stability and refers to SADC's collective response to "emerging security and political challenges." In the same speech Lamola says: "Addressing the challenges associated with irregular migration must occur within an orderly and lawful framework," calls for a region in which citizens enjoy "justice and freedom," and states: "But frameworks acquire meaning only when they are translated into improvements in the lives of our people." [P16] None of those statements determines Mthwakazi's legal status.



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On 14 August 2026, in a SADC Public Lecture at the University of KwaZulu-Natal, President Cyril Ramaphosa addressed SADC engagement with the eastern DRC, Mozambique's Inclusive National Dialogue and Madagascar. Immediately after discussing Madagascar, he stated: "Our task is not to prescribe outcomes to the people of any Member State. It is to hold open the space within which they may determine their own." He then called for election-observation missions to be adequately resourced and able to report plainly, and for established institutions of accountability to be strengthened and allowed to do their work [P30]. The MRP does not treat this as recognition of a right to secession or as a determination that Mthwakazi is a "people."

On 17 August 2026, the 46th Ordinary Summit elected President Ramaphosa Chairperson of SADC [P15]. In the same communiqué, SADC described its engagement in Madagascar, in the stated context of a return to constitutional normalcy, through the Panel of Elders supported by the Mediation Reference Group and the SADC Secretariat; linked that process to inclusive governance, democratic institutions, accountability, human rights and citizen participation; and urged stakeholders to use dialogue to address grievances. The Summit also appointed former Presidents Mokgweetsi Masisi and Joaquim Chissano to the Panel of Elders to support mediation, conflict prevention and preventive diplomacy [P15].

In his Welcome address at the Summit, President Ramaphosa separately called for continued investment in "preventive diplomacy, mediation and political dialogue" and for stronger work by the SADC Panel of Elders, the Organ Troika and regional institutions [P31]. These statements do not establish that any particular mechanism has jurisdiction over or is available to the Mthwakazi claim. They make the institutional question more precise: whether SADC has a route for a peaceful political claim before it develops into a threat to regional peace and security, and, if regional engagement turns on a threshold, what rule sets it and which institution determines when it has been crossed.

6.3 General formulations remain capable of comparative application

South Africa's self-determination propositions in the Chagos and Palestine advisory proceedings were expressed in general legal terms. They are therefore capable of comparative application, subject to the governing facts, the legal characterization of the claim, peoplehood, territorial integrity and the available remedy. That proposition does not import Gaza facts, does not turn Chagos into a post-colonial secession precedent, and does not prejudge the result for Zimbabwe.

South Africa may apply the standard and reach a different result; it may distinguish or narrow the standard by identifying the legally relevant difference; or it may decline to engage. Silence is not consent, estoppel or proof of a legal violation. It would simply create a documented record that the Republic was asked to state the rule it applies and did not do so.


THE THREE AVAILABLE RESPONSES

1. Apply or examine the relevant legal criteria: assess the Zimbabwean record without prejudging the result.
2. Distinguish or narrow the rule: identify the legally relevant distinction and explain why it produces a different outcome.
3. Decline to engage: silence is not consent, estoppel or proof of a legal violation; it creates only a documented record that the Republic was asked to state the rule it applies and did not do so.



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The MRP's contention is therefore not preclusion but explanation. Different cases may properly produce different answers. The requested governmental task is to identify the legal criteria that produce those answers and apply them to the Mthwakazi record.

7. Adverse jurisprudence and AU institutional instruments are part of the submission

The source hierarchy matters. Frontier Dispute is an ICJ Chamber judgment addressing *uti possidetis* in African decolonisation. Katanga and Cabinda are African Commission decisions interpreting the Charter. The 2026 Somalia Declaration and PSC communiqué are high-level AU institutional and political instruments, not judicial or Commission precedents. All are adverse in material respects and are stated on the face of this submission rather than left for the recipient to discover.

7.1 Katangese Peoples' Congress v. Zaire, Communication 75/92

Katanga did not establish an exhaustive definition of "peoples." At paragraph 3 the Commission acknowledged controversy over both the definition of peoples and the content of self-determination. Paragraph 4 recognized that self-determination may take forms including independence, self-government, local government, federalism, confederalism, unitarism or other arrangements. Paragraphs 5–6 nevertheless upheld territorial integrity because the record did not establish violations serious enough to call it into question or denial of participation in government. The absence of a settled peoplehood formula is itself relevant to the legal test the MRP asks DIRCO to state.

African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, Communication 75/92, paras. 3–6 [P5].

7.2 Front for the Liberation of the State of Cabinda v. Angola, Communication 328/06

Cabinda must be stated more precisely than a secession precedent. The Commission recorded that the complainant did not ask it to determine a political right to secede; the merits analysis was confined to claimed economic self-determination and natural-resource rights. Even so, paragraphs 124–126 are materially adverse: the Commission located Article 20 in its anti-colonial historical context, treated certain liberation dimensions as reserved for colonised peoples, rejected distinct pre-colonial history as sufficient by itself, and emphasized post-colonial self-determination within existing territories together with sovereignty, territorial integrity and representation in decision-making. The Commission found no Article 20 violation. Paragraphs 129–131 also confirm that Article 21 continues to operate in post-colonial Africa and that groups and communities, directly or through representatives, may have a role in decisions concerning wealth and natural resources [P6].

African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, Communication 328/06, especially paras. 34, 54, 124–126 and 129–131 [P6].


7.3 African Union Assembly Declaration and PSC Communiqué on Somalia

At its Thirty-Ninth Ordinary Session on 14–15 February 2026, the Assembly adopted Assembly/AU/Decl.2(XXXIX), reaffirming Article 4(b), inherited borders and PSC/MIN/COMM.1324 (2026) [P13]. The PSC communiqué had reaffirmed respect for borders existing on achievement of independence and stated that no actor has authority or standing to alter the territorial



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configuration of an AU Member State [P14]. These are recent high-level institutional positions and substantial adverse material, although their juridical character differs from Commission jurisprudence.

They do not themselves decide whether the Matabele/Mthwakazi community is a “people,” whether meaningful internal self-determination exists, whether non-domination and participation requirements are met, or what Article 21-22 evidence shows. Their force is that inherited-border protection must be confronted directly. External independence cannot be made the sole opening demand.

7.4 Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Republic of Mali), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986

Frontier Dispute is leading adverse authority on the African inherited-border settlement. The Chamber described uti possidetis as a firmly established principle where decolonisation is concerned and, at paragraph 25, said that it “at first sight” conflicts outright with the right of peoples to self-determination. It nevertheless explained that African States had deliberately chosen to respect colonial frontiers and to take account of that choice in the interpretation of self-determination; paragraph 26 stated that uti possidetis retained its place among the most important legal principles despite the apparent contradiction. That is substantial adverse authority. It also makes the interpretive sequence central: inherited borders condition the interpretation of self-determination, but the judgment does not itself identify the relevant “people” within a post-colonial State, decide whether internal self-determination has been meaningfully available, or resolve the Article 20 remedy question presented here.

President Ramaphosa’s 14 August 2026 SADC lecture supplies a contemporary political observation, not a contrary rule of law. Speaking in the context of regional integration, he said colonialism had “deliberately fragmented our region” and “divided communities.” The MRP does not offer that observation against uti possidetis, as a rejection of inherited borders, or as support for territorial revision. Frontier Dispute remains the adverse legal authority stated above. The observation goes only to prior questions that the judgment does not itself answer: the identification of the relevant people, the legal characterization of historical incorporation, and the means by which self-determination is said to have been exercised or satisfied [P30].

ICJ, Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Republic of Mali), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 554, especially paras. 25-26 [P29]. President Cyril Ramaphosa, SADC Public Lecture, University of KwaZulu-Natal, 14 August 2026 [P30].

8. The threshold question: is there a relevant “people”?


The MRP submits that the Matabele/Mthwakazi community is capable of being assessed as a “people” for purposes of the African Charter. It does not ask Parliament to accept that proposition on assertion. It asks that the issue be tested against a documented record.

Element	Submission / issue to prove	Evidence standard
Historical polity	Contemporaneous British records and In re Southern Rhodesia [1919] AC 211 record colonial-era British recognition of Lobengula as sovereign and the subsequent conquest. The case is used subject to the express limitations stated below.	Primary legal/historical records.



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Element	Submission / issue to prove	Evidence standard
Territorial referent	Historical maps, administrative records and settlement evidence should identify the territorial core while acknowledging disputes over precise historical reach.	Maps and archival material.
Collective identity and continuity	Language, history, culture, self-identification, demographic material and institutions must show a continuing collective identity, not merely an elite political claim.	Demographic, linguistic and historical evidence.
Collective political expression	The MRP records a 2023 petition to SADC and a continuing programme of peaceful political advocacy. No precise signature count or registry claim is relied upon here unless supported by the original petition and registry/transmission evidence identified in D2 and produced to the Committee on request.	Original petition, signature pages, registry/reference evidence and proof of transmission required before any exact count is relied upon.
Participation and internal remedies	Cabinda and Katanga make meaningful participation central. The record must therefore show what political, judicial and regional avenues exist, have been used, or have proved ineffective.	Court, police, human-rights, electoral and ACHPR records.
Treatment and non-domination	Historical atrocity evidence and contemporary discrimination or repression must be proved by primary documents, affidavits, official records and comparative data.	Evidence, not analogy, controls.

Historical anchor and limitation. In *re Southern Rhodesia* [1919] AC 211 is relied upon only as a colonial-era historical record of British recognition of Lobengula's sovereignty and of the acquisition of territory through conquest. At p. 214 the reported judgment records Queen Victoria's recognition of Lobengula as sovereign and British official descriptions of him as an independent ruler; the same discussion cautions that Matabeleland and Mashonaland were not clearly distinguished territorial units. The judgment's holding on unalienated land/title is adverse to indigenous proprietary claims, and its reasoning contains colonial and racial characterizations that the MRP rejects. The case is not relied upon as proof of modern boundaries, contemporary peoplehood, continuous proprietary title or modern self-determination law. Relevant reported passages include pp. 214, 233-235 and 240 [P26].

9. The present-tense African Charter case


The MRP's present legal center of gravity is the African Charter, not a retroactive Genocide Convention claim. Zimbabwe is a State Party: the African Commission's status table records ratification on 30 May 1986 and deposit on 12 June 1986. South Africa became a party on 9 July 1996 [P20]. The following provisions organize the present evidentiary program:

- **Article 19 — equality of peoples / non-domination:** Whether one people is subjected to domination by another; requires proof of institutional and political realities, not rhetoric alone.



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- **Article 20 — self-determination:** Whether the relevant community is a “people,” whether meaningful internal self-determination exists, and what form of political status is legally available.
- **Article 21 — wealth and natural resources:** Whether groups or communities are meaningfully represented in decisions concerning wealth and natural resources, while recognizing the State’s authority to regulate resources in the general interest; Cabinda makes primary economic and resource evidence necessary.
- **Article 22 — development:** Whether economic, social and cultural development is pursued with due regard to freedom and identity; requires comparative, causal evidence.
- **Articles 2-3 — non-discrimination / equality:** Ethnic, linguistic, regional or political unequal treatment, where independently proved.
- **Articles 9-11 — expression, association, assembly:** Treatment of peaceful self-determination advocacy and MRP political activity.
- **Article 13 — participation:** Participation in government and access to public service; particularly important under Katanga and Cabinda.
- **Article 17 — education / culture:** Language, curriculum, cultural institutions and identity where evidence supports the claim.

African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Part I. [Official Charter text](#)

10. Gukurahundi: historical gravity, present relevance, temporal discipline

Gukurahundi is central to the historical and political context, but this submission deliberately avoids a temporal treaty error. The principal mass-killing period identified in the MRP record is 1983–1987. The United Nations Treaty Collection records Zimbabwe’s accession to the Genocide Convention on 13 May 1991, with effect from 11 August 1991 [P21]. In *Croatia v. Serbia*, the ICJ addressed *ratione temporis* and held, *inter alia*, that the Convention’s substantive obligations did not impose obligations in relation to acts preceding the Convention’s entry into force for the State concerned; the prevention obligation likewise cannot logically apply before the State is bound (Judgment, 2015, paras. 95, 100) [P22].

Accordingly, the MRP does not ask the Committee to treat the 1983–1987 killings as a retroactive Genocide Convention breach. Gukurahundi remains relevant to historical relations between the State and the Matabele population, accountability and remedy, political participation and domination, and the context in which independently proven conduct occurring after 11 August 1991 must be assessed under the law then in force.

The evidentiary rule is narrower than a present genocide allegation: historical atrocity does not automatically establish a current legal violation, but present treatment of the affected community need not be evaluated as though the historical campaign and unresolved accountability record never occurred.


11. Reserved atrocity-law question: not part of the present Article 20 request

This submission does not ask the Committee to determine that genocide is occurring in Zimbabwe or to infer present genocidal intent. Gukurahundi is used here as historical, participation and accountability context for the African Charter case—not as a substitute for proof of a present Genocide Convention claim.



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If independently verified evidence were to establish a present serious risk of genocide, prevention would be a separate legal inquiry. Bosnia v. Serbia describes the duty to prevent as arising when a State learns, or should normally have learned, of a serious risk and treats capacity to influence as relevant to what reasonable preventive measures are available (Judgment, 2007, paras. 430–431) [P3]. That separate question is not one of the Committee requests below.

12. Requested action by the Portfolio Committee

The MRP respectfully requests institutional action proportionate to the Committee's oversight function. It does not request a parliamentary declaration of Mthwakazi independence. The MRP asks first for acknowledgment and placement of the submission, and then asks the Committee to put the following four core legal questions to DIRCO.

Procedural request: acknowledge receipt of MRP/SA-IL/2026/01 and confirm that the submission has been placed before the Portfolio Committee.

Four core legal questions

1. Ask DIRCO to state the legal criteria South Africa uses to identify a “people” for purposes of Article 20 of the African Charter.
2. Ask DIRCO to apply those criteria to the Matabele/Mthwakazi community, give reasons, and—if Article 20 is engaged—state what forms of self-determination South Africa considers legally available in light of Katanga, Cabinda, sovereignty and territorial integrity.
3. Ask DIRCO to state the order in which it applies the relevant rules: does it first identify the relevant “people” and determine whether the right of self-determination was exercised or satisfied before applying uti possidetis and territorial-integrity constraints, or does the inherited boundary itself determine the relevant territorial unit before the peoplehood/self-determination inquiry? Ask DIRCO to state the legal basis for that sequence, including how it reads Chagos paragraphs 60 and 75–76 together with Frontier Dispute paragraphs 25–26 [P29].
4. Ask DIRCO to identify the legally relevant distinctions South Africa relies upon when reaching different positions on Palestine, Chagos, Western Sahara, Somaliland and Mthwakazi. In particular, ask it to address DIRCO's 29 December 2025 Somaliland distinction between decolonisation and secession, because that is the clearest instance in which DIRCO itself stated a distinction, classified a claim and published the consequence [P11, P25].


Additional matters

- Ask DIRCO whether peaceful advocacy for a change in political status is legitimate democratic expression even where the South African Government opposes the requested outcome.
- Ask DIRCO whether SADC's institutional architecture provides any mechanism through which a peaceful political claim that has not developed into a threat to regional peace and security may be received, referred or considered; what legal or institutional rule establishes any threshold for regional engagement; which SADC institution determines when that threshold has been crossed; and whether South Africa, during President Ramaphosa's SADC chairship, would transmit, refer or raise the matter through any such mechanism [P15, P23–P24, P31].
- Ask DIRCO, as a separate domestic-law question, whether South Africa regards peaceful community self-determination advocacy as a constitutionally recognized subject of political and legal discussion within section 235's own limits; this request does not treat section 235 as a source of rights outside the Republic.



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- If the Committee considers it useful, invite the MRP to make an oral submission and to place the underlying peoplehood, ACHPR, Gukurahundi and contemporary evidence before Members.

13. Matters expressly not claimed

- South Africa has not admitted that Mthwakazi is entitled to independence.
- South Africa is not legally estopped from defending Zimbabwe's territorial integrity merely because it has pleaded other self-determination cases.
- Palestine, Chagos, Western Sahara, Somaliland and Mthwakazi are not asserted to be factually identical; Chagos propositions are used with their decolonisation context stated.
- The ICJ has not finally found that Israel committed genocide in South Africa v. Israel. This submission does not rely on any final merits finding; the 26 January 2024 Order cited here concerned provisional measures and plausible rights rather than a final merits determination [P4].
- Zimbabwe's Genocide Convention obligations are not asserted to operate retroactively over the 1983–1987 period; the Convention took effect for Zimbabwe on 11 August 1991.
- No present South African Genocide Convention prevention duty is asserted in this submission. Any such question would require a separate serious-risk analysis under the applicable law.
- Section 235 is not relied upon as a source of Mthwakazi rights outside South Africa, and historical distinctness alone is not asserted to overcome Katanga, Cabinda, uti possidetis or the territorial-integrity principle.

14. Conclusion

The MRP accepts that South Africa may reject the political conclusion it seeks. What this submission requests is not agreement but a legal account.

South Africa has told the International Court of Justice that self-determination is a right of all peoples, has relied on Article 20 of the African Charter, and—in the Chagos decolonisation context—has linked self-determination to territorial integrity while also pleading inherited-border constraints. South Africa's Constitution recognizes the notion of community self-determination within the Republic, while African Commission jurisprudence and the African Union's 2026 Somalia instruments impose serious limits. This submission places both sides of that record before the Committee.

Those propositions do not decide the Mthwakazi question. They make the question unavoidable.

The Republic of South Africa is free to distinguish Mthwakazi from every comparator cited here. The MRP asks that the distinction be stated, supported by a legal test and applied to the evidence rather than left as an unspoken political outcome.


FINAL REQUEST

Please acknowledge receipt, place this submission before the Portfolio Committee, and seek one considered institutional response from DIRCO to the core legal questions above. No further serial correspondence on the same questions is intended pending a response or material development.



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Submitted respectfully,

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In Pursuit of Truth, Justice and Peace During Our Lifetime

Annex Schedule


Only A1-A4 are filed as attachments. Public B-, C- and D-series sources are incorporated by the clickable URLs in this register and are not physically attached. For every linked source, the MRP retains a dated preservation copy and will provide it to the Committee on request. Where a D-series item is non-public, the entry states that the primary material is held by the MRP and available to the Committee on request or at an oral hearing, subject where appropriate to privacy and safety safeguards.

Annex	Document / online source	Identifier / locator	Filing treatment / URL
A1	MRP letter, 6 August 2026	South Africa's Selective Principles, Mthwakazi Self-Determination, and Afrophobia	ATTACH: delivered copy bearing the physical DIRCO receipt stamp dated 6 August 2026.
A2	MRP Written Questions, 10 August 2026	Written Questions on the Doctrine of Inherited Borders	ATTACH: final issued version. No standalone 10 August transmission record is held in the filing record. A4's 12 August transmission to AU and SADC channels expressly identifies A2 and provides partial corroboration only; it does not prove that A2 itself was transmitted on 10 August.
A3	MRP letter, 11 August 2026	South Africa Wrote the Rule — Now Apply It to Mthwakazi	ATTACH: final signed copy and preserved 11 August email transmittal. A contemporaneous external copy with original headers is retained and available on request.
A4	MRP supplemental letter, 12 August 2026	South Africa's Own Pleadings Before the International Court of Justice, and Their Application in Southern Africa	ATTACH: final signed copy and preserved 12 August email transmittal (14:10:47 UTC). A contemporaneous external copy with original headers is retained and available on request.
B1	South Africa, Chagos Written Statement	ICJ 169-20180301-WRI-12-00-EN; paras. 4, 6, 9, 12, 55, 60, 63-65, 75-76, 83	URL only: Official ICJ source
B2	South Africa, Palestine Written Statement	ICJ 186-20230725-WRI-14-00-EN; paras. 9, 47-48, 50-51	URL only: Official ICJ source
B3	ICJ Order, 26 January 2024	South Africa v. Israel — Provisional Measures	URL only: Official ICJ Order Current ICJ case page



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
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Annex	Document / online source	Identifier / locator	Filing treatment / URL
B4	SADC 46th Ordinary Summit Communiqué, 17 August 2026	46th Ordinary Summit of SADC Heads of State and Government; especially paras. 4, 9, 10 and 32	URL only: Official SADC communiqué
B5	Ronald Lamola acceptance speech, 12 August 2026	SADC Council of Ministers, Durban	URL only: Official DIRCO transcript
B6	Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996	Sections 231(4), 232, 233, 235	URL only: Official Constitution
B7	South Africa, Initial Report required by Article 62 of the African Charter	Historical state-report material; Article 20 / section 235 / Volkstaat discussion	URL only: Official historical state report
B8	Parliamentary Communications media statement, 8 December 2022	Public hearings on terrorism amendment legislation	URL only: Parliament media statement
B9	SADC institutional framework	Treaty; Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation; current Organ/MCO material	URL only: SADC Treaty SADC Protocol Current MCO source
B10	DIRCO Western Sahara comparator	Minister Ronald Lamola, Budget Vote 2026/27, 26 May 2026	URL only: Official DIRCO source
B11	SADC Extraordinary Summit Communiqué, 7 November 2025	Appointment of South Africa as Interim Chair of SADC until August 2026	URL only: Official SADC communiqué
B12	President Cyril Ramaphosa, SADC Public Lecture, 14 August 2026	46th SADC Summit public lecture, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Westville Campus; political-process and colonial-fragmentation passages used in Sections 6.2 and 7.4	URL only: Official Presidency transcript Gov.za mirror
B13	President Cyril Ramaphosa, Welcome address at the 46th Ordinary Summit, 17 August 2026	46th Ordinary Summit of SADC Heads of State and Government, eThekweni; preventive diplomacy, mediation, political dialogue, Panel of Elders and Organ Troika passage used in Section 6.2	URL only: Official South African Government transcript
C1	African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights	Arts. 2, 3, 9–11, 13, 17, 19–22; State-party status	URL only: African Charter State-party status
C2	Katangese Peoples' Congress v. Zaire	Communication 75/92; especially paras. 3–6	URL only: Official Commission decision
C3	Front for the Liberation of the State of Cabinda v. Angola	Communication 328/06; especially paras. 34, 54, 124–126, 129–131	URL only: Official Commission decision
C4	AU Assembly Declaration on Somalia	Assembly/AU/Decl.2(XXXIX), 14–15 February 2026	URL only: Official AU 39th Session source
C5	AU Peace and Security Council Communiqué	PSC/MIN/COMM.1324 (2026), 6 January 2026	URL only: Official PSC source
C6	ICJ, Croatia v. Serbia	Judgment, 3 February 2015; paras. 95, 100	URL only: Official ICJ judgment



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
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Annex	Document / online source	Identifier / locator	Filing treatment / URL
C7	ICJ, Bosnia v. Serbia	Judgment, 26 February 2007; paras. 430–431	URL only: Official ICJ judgment
C8	ICJ, Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Republic of Mali)	Judgment, 22 December 1986; I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 554; especially paras. 25–26	URL only: Official ICJ judgment
D1	Historical-polity source	In re Southern Rhodesia [1919] AC 211; pp. 214, 233–235, 240	URL only: Reported judgment reproduction
D2	2023 MRP SADC petition record	Public corroboration plus MRP-held original petition, signature pages and registry/transmission material; no exact signature count is relied upon unless the primary record is produced	URL only for public corroboration; primary material held by MRP and available on request: CITE report (2023) The Standard report (2023)
D3	African Court Registry correspondence and route to the African Commission	Registry letters of 7 May 2021 (Ref. AFCHPR/Reg.Misc./05/2021/013) and 4 November 2022 (Ref. AFCHPR/REG.MISC./10/2022/022). The 7 May 2021 letter states that Zimbabwe had neither ratified the Court Protocol nor deposited the Article 34(6) declaration and that the Court lacked jurisdiction over an individual application; it directed the matter to the African Commission. The 4 November 2022 letter reiterated that Zimbabwe was not a party to the Protocol and again advised filing with the Commission in Banjul.	Official corroboration of Article 34(6) status: African Court Article 34(6) declarations page . Primary African Court Registry correspondence is held by the MRP and available to the Committee on request.
D4	African Commission follow-through after the Court referral	Complaint submitted 24 April 2023; ACHPR acknowledgment dated 6 June 2023, Ref. ACHPR/STC/632/23, states that the complaint would be processed under Rule 115 and that a seizure decision would be communicated within 60 days. Follow-up of 11 October 2023 recorded expiry of that period; no written seizure decision has been communicated in the record held for this filing.	No public URL. Primary acknowledgment and follow-up correspondence are held by the MRP and available to the Committee on request.
D5	Gukurahundi documentary source	Breaking the Silence, Building True Peace	URL only: Public report PDF
D6	Contemporary incidents / political-space evidentiary set	Affidavits, court and police records, authenticated official statements, videos and correspondence relevant to present-tense claims under Articles 2–3, 9–11, 13 and 19–20	No public URL. Held by the MRP and available to the Committee on request or at an oral hearing, subject to privacy and safety safeguards.



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Annex	Document / online source	Identifier / locator	Filing treatment / URL
D7	Development / participation / resources evidentiary set	Budget, education, health, infrastructure, language, public-service, development and natural-resource comparative material relevant to Articles 13, 17, 19, 21 and 22	No public URL. Held by the MRP and available to the Committee on request or at an oral hearing.


Primary Authorities and Source Links

- P1** Government of the Republic of South Africa, Written Statement, Legal Consequences of the Separation of the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius in 1965, 1 March 2018, ICJ document 169-20180301-WRI-12-00-EN. [Official ICJ source](#)
- P2** Government of the Republic of South Africa, Written Statement, Legal Consequences arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, 25 July 2023, ICJ document 186-20230725-WRI-14-00-EN. [Official ICJ source](#)
- P3** ICJ, Application of the Genocide Convention (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, 26 February 2007, especially paras. 430–431. [Official ICJ source](#)
- P4** ICJ, South Africa v. Israel, Order on Provisional Measures, 26 January 2024. [Official ICJ source](#) | [Current ICJ case page](#)
- P5** African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, Katangese Peoples' Congress v. Zaire, Communication 75/92, paras. 3–6. [Official Commission decision](#)
- P6** African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, Front for the Liberation of the State of Cabinda v. Angola, Communication 328/06. [Official Commission decision](#)
- P7** African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights. [Official Charter source](#)
- P8** Parliament of South Africa, role and functions of parliamentary committees. [Parliament source](#)
- P9** Parliament of South Africa, Portfolio Committee on International Relations and Cooperation — current committee page and secretariat. [Parliament source](#)
- P10** DIRCO, Office of the Chief State Law Adviser (International Law). [DIRCO source](#)
- P11** DIRCO, “South Africa reaffirms commitment to Somalia’s sovereignty and regional stability,” 29 December 2025. [DIRCO source](#)
- P12** United Nations DPPA, Assistant Secretary-General Khaled Khiari, remarks to the Security Council on Israel’s recognition of Somaliland, 29 December 2025. [Official UN source](#)
- P13** African Union Assembly, Declaration on the Preservation of the Sovereignty, Territorial Integrity, Unity, and Stability of the Federal Republic of Somalia, Assembly/AU/Decl.2(XXXIX), 14–15 February 2026. [Official AU 39th Session source](#)
- P14** African Union Peace and Security Council, Communiqué PSC/MIN/COMM.1324 (2026), 6 January 2026. [Official PSC source](#)
- P15** SADC, Communiqué of the 46th Ordinary Summit of SADC Heads of State and Government, 17 August 2026 — records President Cyril Ramaphosa’s election as Chairperson of SADC at para. 4 and, especially at paras. 9, 10 and 32, the Madagascar engagement through the Panel of Elders, Mediation Reference Group and Secretariat, dialogue to address grievances, and appointments to the Panel of Elders for mediation, conflict prevention and preventive diplomacy. [Official SADC source](#)
- P16** DIRCO, Acceptance Speech and Opening Remarks by Minister Ronald O. Lamola, SADC Council of Ministers, Durban, 12 August 2026; official transcript containing the quotations used in Section 6.2 and the reference to Zambia as incoming Council Chair. [Official DIRCO transcript](#)
- P17** Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, ss. 231(4), 232, 233 and 235. [Official Department of Justice source](#)
- P18** South Africa, Initial Report required by Article 62 of the African Charter; historical state-report material hosted by the Department of Justice; Article 20 section reproduces section 235 and records the Volkstaat Council mandate. [Historical official state-report source](#)



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P19 Parliamentary Communications, Media Statement on Select Committee on Security and Justice public hearings, 8 December 2022. [Parliament media statement](#)

P20 African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, African Charter State-party status table: Zimbabwe ratification 30 May 1986 / deposit 12 June 1986; South Africa became a party on 9 July 1996. [Official ACHPR status table](#)

P21 United Nations treaty records for the Genocide Convention — Zimbabwe accession 13 May 1991; the May 1991 Monthly Statement records effect from 11 August 1991. [Accession record](#) [UN Monthly Statement](#)

P22 ICJ, Application of the Genocide Convention (Croatia v. Serbia), Judgment, 3 February 2015, especially paras. 95 and 100. [Official ICJ judgment](#)

P23 SADC, Consolidated Text of the Treaty of the Southern African Development Community, including Article 10A institutional framework. [Official SADC treaty source](#)

P24 SADC, Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation (2001), together with the current SADC institutional description of the Ministerial Committee of the Organ. [Official Protocol](#) [Current MCO source](#)

P25 DIRCO, Minister Ronald Lamola, Budget Vote 2026/27, Parliament, 26 May 2026 — South Africa's stated support for the right of the people of Western Sahara to self-determination. [Official DIRCO source](#)

P26 In re Southern Rhodesia [1919] AC 211, reported judgment text, especially pp. 214, 233-235 and 240. Used only for the limited historical propositions stated in Section 8. [Reported judgment reproduction](#)

P27 SADC Secretariat, "South Africa takes over the Chairship of SADC Council of Ministers as the Region advances regional integration and resilience," 12 August 2026; states that South Africa formally assumed the Council chairship on 12 August for August 2026–August 2027. [Official SADC source](#)

P28 SADC, Communiqué of the Extraordinary Summit of Heads of State and Government, 7 November 2025 — records South Africa's appointment as Interim Chair of SADC until August 2026. [Official SADC source](#)

P29 ICJ, Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Republic of Mali), Judgment, 22 December 1986, I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 554, especially paras. 25–26. [Official ICJ judgment](#)

P30 President Cyril Ramaphosa, Public Lecture on the occasion of the 46th SADC Summit, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Westville Campus, Durban, 14 August 2026 — official Presidency transcript containing the political-process and colonial-fragmentation passages used in Sections 6.2 and 7.4. [Official Presidency transcript](#) | [Gov.za mirror](#)

P31 President Cyril Ramaphosa, Welcome address at the 46th Ordinary Summit of SADC Heads of State and Government, eThekweni, 17 August 2026 — official transcript containing the preventive diplomacy, mediation, political dialogue, Panel of Elders and Organ Troika passage used in Section 6.2. [Official South African Government source](#)



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Thursday, 06 August 2026

His Excellency Matamela Cyril Ramaphosa

President of the Republic of South Africa

The Presidency

Pretoria, Republic of South Africa

The Honourable Ronald O. Lamola, MP

Minister of International Relations and Cooperation

Department of International Relations and Cooperation

Pretoria, Republic of South Africa



Re: South Africa's Selective Principles, Mthwakazi Self-Determination, and Afrophobia

Your Excellency President Ramaphosa,

Honourable Minister Lamola,

I write on behalf of the Mthwakazi Republic Party concerning South Africa's selective application of the principles it repeatedly invokes before the world: international law, self-determination, human dignity, human rights, anti-genocide obligations, protection of political prisoners, and equal justice.

South Africa has spoken forcefully when the subject is Israel. President Ramaphosa has told the United Nations that South Africa is called to uphold the principles of the UN Charter and the fundamental tenets of international law "*consistently and in their entirety*."¹ South Africa has brought proceedings against Israel before the International Court of Justice under the Genocide Convention. The Presidency has argued that "*self-defense is not a defence to genocide*."²

South Africa has also said that it acts within institutions of global governance to protect the rights of Palestinians in Gaza and to obtain the "*fair and equal application of international law to all*."³ The phrase "to all" is the point of this letter.

Minister Lamola has stated that South Africa's foreign policy is anchored in Ubuntu, justice, international law, dialogue, multilateralism, and the needs of South Africa's region and continent. In the same Budget Vote, he reaffirmed South Africa's "*principled support for the right of the people of Western Sahara to self-determination, in line with international law and United Nations resolutions*."⁴

President Ramaphosa has repeatedly used the language of principle in relation to Palestine, Western Sahara, and the international legal order. South Africa's own government has described its case against Israel as rooted in constitutional values, international law obligations, and accountability under the Genocide Convention.⁵

Mthwakazi does not object to South Africa invoking principle. Mthwakazi objects to South Africa invoking principle selectively.

When South Africa speaks about Israel, it insists that international law applies without exception. When South Africa speaks about Palestine, it invokes occupation, dignity, genocide, displacement, humanitarian access, political prisoners, self-determination and international accountability. When South Africa speaks about Western Sahara, it defends the Sahrawi people's right to determine their future.

But when Mthwakazi raises the same language, South Africa is silent.

Why do the principles of international law apply to Israel, but not to Zimbabwe?

Why does South Africa demand accountability for Palestinians, but not for the victims and descendants of Gukurahundi?



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Why does South Africa defend Sahrawi self-determination, but refuse even to acknowledge Mthwakazi self-determination?

Why does South Africa speak of political prisoners abroad, but remain silent when peaceful Mthwakazi activists are intimidated, arrested, prosecuted, or threatened?

Why does South Africa insist that the world must not be passive before suffering in Gaza, but acts as though suffering in Matabeleland is an internal inconvenience for Harare to manage?

We refer also to public reporting that the Frente POLISARIO brought before the United Nations Security Council the case of Sahrawi political prisoner Enaama Asfari, who reportedly began an indefinite hunger strike on 8 June 2026 at Kenitra prison in Morocco. The appeal sought urgent international attention to his life, health, detention conditions, the situation of other Gdeim Izik prisoners, and the broader demand for human-rights monitoring in Western Sahara.⁶

If South Africa assisted, transmitted, sponsored, supported, or facilitated the elevation of that matter into the United Nations Security Council record, then South Africa has accepted an important principle:

When a state imprisons or mistreats activists connected to a people's self-determination claim, the matter is not merely an internal criminal issue. It may be evidence of an unresolved national conflict requiring international scrutiny.

Mthwakazi accepts that principle. We now demand its equal application.

The people of Mthwakazi have endured Gukurahundi, political exclusion, linguistic domination, economic neglect, marginalization, centralized control from Harare, and the continuing refusal of Zimbabwe to permit a lawful, peaceful, democratic process through which the people of Mthwakazi may determine their political future.

Zimbabwe treats peaceful Mthwakazi self-determination advocacy as disloyalty, extremism, criminality, or sedition. Yet South Africa expects the world to treat Sahrawi self-determination as a legitimate international question.

That is hypocrisy.

President Ramaphosa, you have recently stated that there is no space for "xenophobia, racism, sexism, Afrophobia or any other forms of intolerance in South Africa."⁷ You repeated the same principle in later remarks, saying that there is no place for racism, sexism, tribalism, xenophobia, Afrophobia or any other form of intolerance.⁸

Mthwakazi now invokes your own word.

If South Africa recognizes the humanity, dignity, political prisoners, and self-determination rights of Sahrawis and Palestinians abroad, but refuses to recognize the same democratic rights of an African people in its own region, that is not principled foreign policy.

It is selective African solidarity. It is regional hypocrisy. It is Afrophobia.

Afrophobia is not only mob violence against African migrants in the streets. Afrophobia is also the diplomatic erasure of African peoples whose suffering is inconvenient to established African governments. It is the refusal to hear Africans when their demand embarrasses a neighboring ruling party. It is the use of liberation language abroad while protecting post-colonial domination at home.

South Africa cannot condemn Afrophobia inside its borders while practicing diplomatic Afrophobia in its foreign policy.

South Africa's case against Israel rests on the claim that law must prevail over power; that civilians must not be destroyed, displaced, starved, or collectively punished; that international institutions must be used when a state fails to restrain itself; and that the world has a duty to act



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before suffering becomes irreversible. South Africa's own public statements accuse Israel of killing Palestinians, depriving them of humanitarian assistance, creating conditions of life aimed at their physical destruction, using starvation as a weapon of war, and seeking depopulation through mass death and forced displacement.⁹

Mthwakazi asks South Africa to apply those same principles to Africa.

Apply them to Gukurahundi.

Apply them to Zimbabwe's refusal of accountability.

Apply them to the intimidation of peaceful Mthwakazi activists.

Apply them to the denial of democratic consent.

- Apply them to peoples in Southern Africa, not only peoples whose suffering can be used against Israel.

We therefore call upon the Government of South Africa to do one of two things.

First, apply the same standard to Mthwakazi that South Africa applies to Palestine and Western Sahara.

Or second, publicly state that South Africa's support for self-determination, political prisoners, referenda, dignity, liberation, international scrutiny and anti-genocide principle applies only to peoples selected by Pretoria for ideological convenience.

Mthwakazi demands clarity.

We request that the Government of South Africa:

1. State publicly whether peaceful advocacy for Mthwakazi self-determination is legitimate democratic expression.
2. Meet with representatives of the Mthwakazi Republic Party to receive evidence concerning Gukurahundi, political repression, intimidation of activists, and the denial of democratic consent.
3. Explain the criteria by which South Africa distinguishes Western Sahara's self-determination claim from Mthwakazi's self-determination claim.
4. Explain why South Africa invokes genocide, displacement, civilian protection and international accountability against Israel, but has not demanded comparable scrutiny of Zimbabwe's historic and continuing conduct toward Mthwakazi.
5. Confirm whether South Africa assisted, transmitted, sponsored, supported, or facilitated the placement of the Enaama Asfari matter before the United Nations Security Council, and if so, explain why comparable attention is not afforded to Mthwakazi activists and communities.
6. Support independent documentation of the treatment of Mthwakazi activists and communities.
7. Transmit, sponsor, or facilitate a factual Mthwakazi memorandum to relevant African Union, SADC, United Nations, parliamentary, and human-rights mechanisms.
8. Call upon Zimbabwe to guarantee that peaceful Mthwakazi self-determination advocacy will not be criminalized.
9. Affirm that no African government may use sovereignty as a shield to silence a people whose consent it refuses to seek.

South Africa's foreign policy cannot be credible if its principles stop at the Limpopo.

It cannot be moral if it speaks for Palestinians and Sahrawis but refuses to hear Mthwakazi.

It cannot be anti-Afrophobic if it defends some African peoples and erases others.



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Mthwakazi is not asking South Africa to invent a new doctrine. We are asking South Africa to apply the doctrine it already proclaims.

International law.

Human dignity.

Self-determination.

Political prisoners.

Anti-genocide obligations.

Democratic consent.

International scrutiny.

Equal justice.

If these principles are valid in Gaza, they cannot be dismissed in Matabeleland.

If they are valid in Western Sahara, they cannot be invisible in Mthwakazi.

If South Africa believes Israel must answer before the International Court of Justice, then South Africa must explain why Zimbabwe should not answer before the conscience of Africa.

If South Africa believes that Sahrawi political prisoners belong before the Security Council, then South Africa must explain why the suppression of Mthwakazi activists belongs nowhere.

If South Africa believes that the Sahrawi people have the right to determine their own future, then South Africa must explain why the people of Mthwakazi are denied the same respect.

We await your response.

Until then, South Africa's silence will speak for itself.

Respectfully,

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Matabeleland demands justice, fairness, and recognition. Enough is enough.

Sisonke Sibambene SinguMthwakazi Sesikulungisa!



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
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
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MTHWAKAZI REPUBLIC PARTY

Office of the President

WRITTEN QUESTIONS ON THE DOCTRINE OF INHERITED BORDERS

10 August 2026

Addressed to:

H.E. the Chairperson of the African Union Commission, Addis Ababa
The Chairperson of the Assembly of the African Union
The Department of International Relations and Cooperation, Republic of South Africa
The Executive Secretary, Southern African Development Community, Gaborone

I. Purpose

These questions are submitted by the Mthwakazi Republic Party. They seek a reasoned statement of doctrine. They do not seek recognition, and no part of this submission should be read as a request for recognition. They ask the African Union and its members to identify the legal test they apply when a people asserts a claim to sovereign status, and to apply that test consistently.


II. The positions of record

1. On 26 December 2025 the Chairperson of the African Union Commission rejected any initiative aimed at recognising Somaliland as an independent entity, invoking respect for the intangibility of borders inherited at independence as affirmed by the Organisation of African Unity in 1964.
2. On 6 January 2026 the Peace and Security Council, at ministerial level, condemned the recognition and resolved that no actor has the authority or standing to alter the territorial configuration of a member state.
3. At its 39th Ordinary Session, held in Addis Ababa on 14 and 15 February 2026, the Assembly of the Union adopted the Declaration on the Preservation of the Sovereignty, Territorial Integrity, Unity, and Stability of the Federal Republic of Somalia, Assembly/AU/Decl.2(XXXIX). By paragraph 3 of that Declaration the Assembly “FULLY ENDORSE[D]” the communiqué of 6 January 2026 and the Chairperson’s statement of 26 December 2025. The Declaration further reaffirms Article 4(b) of the Constitutive Act and the Cairo principle of inherited borders, condemns and rejects the recognition, and holds any such recognition to be null, void and without legal effect under international law. These questions are accordingly addressed to a doctrine promulgated by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, and not to a position taken by the Commission alone.
4. The Commission restated that position on 19 April 2026.
5. The member-state pages published across African Union domains describe the Somali Republic as having been formed on 1 July 1960 by the unification of the former Italian trust territory and “the State of Somaliland,” being the former British protectorate. That text remains published as at the date of this submission.



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6. The General Assembly, by resolution 1418 (XIV) of 5 December 1959, fixed 1 July 1960 as the date of independence for the trust territory. The British protectorate became independent on 26 June 1960. The union followed on 1 July 1960.


III. Questions

1. Does the principle of intangibility of inherited borders attach only to the borders of the composite state existing at the conclusion of decolonisation, or does it also attach to the borders and sovereign status of political entities that existed immediately before entry into a voluntary union?
2. On what date, and by operation of what legal instrument, does the African Union consider that the entity its own publications describe as the State of Somaliland ceased to possess statehood?
3. Does the African Union stand by the description of that entity published on its member-state pages? If it does not, will it correct the text and state the correct historical account? If it does, how is that description reconciled with the position that the territory has never been anything other than an integral part of the Federal Republic of Somalia?
4. Where a union was created by the consent of the entities joining it, does the African Union hold that such consent is irrevocable in perpetuity? If so, on what legal authority does that conclusion rest?
5. The Cairo resolution of 1964 was adopted by the states then in existence. On what basis is it held to bind peoples who were not represented at Cairo and who have never given consent to the borders it protects?
6. Where a territory was incorporated into a colonial state by military conquest and subsequent annexation by a chartered company, without plebiscite, treaty of union or any recorded act of consent by its population, does the African Union hold that the resulting border enjoys the same protection as a border created by voluntary union?
7. Has the African Union at any time examined the legal character of the incorporation of the territory of the Matabele nation into Southern Rhodesia following the war of 1893? If such an examination exists, will the Union produce it? If none exists, will the Union state that no such examination has been undertaken?
8. Does the Union's doctrine admit of any circumstance in which the conduct of a state towards a population within its borders bears upon the durability of that state's territorial claim? If it does, what is the threshold, what body determines it, and by what procedure is it invoked? If it does not, will the Union state plainly that territorial integrity is absolute and that no conduct whatever can qualify it?
9. To the Republic of South Africa: Pretoria treats the pre-union territorial status of Western Sahara as determinative of the Sahrawi claim. By what principle is historical territorial status determinative in that case, immaterial in the case of Somaliland, and unexamined in the case of Mthwakazi?
10. To the Southern African Development Community: does the Community hold that the events in Matabeleland and the Midlands between 1983 and 1987, and the circumstances in which the accord of 22 December 1987 was concluded, are wholly irrelevant to any question concerning the territorial



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arrangement in Zimbabwe? If they are relevant, to what question are they relevant, and before which body may that question be raised?

11. Does Assembly/AU/Decl.2(XXXIX), and in particular its reaffirmation of Article 4(b) of the Constitutive Act, its reaffirmation of the Cairo principle of inherited borders, and its full endorsement of PSC/MIN/COMM.1324 (2026), adopted at the 1324th meeting of the Peace and Security Council on 6 January 2026, state a rule of general application governing all claims to sovereign status in Africa, or is the Declaration confined to the particular circumstances of Somalia? If it states a general rule, what is the legal test by which that rule applies to territories incorporated by conquest rather than by voluntary union? If it is confined to Somalia, what rule does the African Union apply elsewhere?


IV. Request

A reasoned written reply is requested within sixty days of receipt. Should no reply be received, that fact will be recorded and published, together with the date of transmission and the recipients.

The Mthwakazi Republic Party places on record that it does not assert that the history of Somaliland is the history of Mthwakazi. It asserts that the questions above are prior questions, that they are the same questions in both cases, and that no African institution has yet answered them.

Mqondisi Moyo

President, Mthwakazi Republic Party



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Annex — Documentary references

African Union member-state page, Federal Republic of Somalia: organs.au.int/en/member-states/somalia; achpr.au.int/en/member-states/somalia; aprm.au.int/en/member-states/somalia; saro.au.int/en/member-states/somalia.

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
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11 August 2026

His Excellency Cyril Ramaphosa

President of the Republic of South Africa
President of the African National Congress
Pretoria, South Africa

The Honourable Ronald Lamola, MP

Minister of International Relations and Cooperation
Republic of South Africa
Pretoria, South Africa

RE: SOUTH AFRICA WROTE THE RULE — NOW APPLY IT TO MTHWAKAZI

Your Excellency and Honourable Minister,

I write on behalf of the Mthwakazi Republic Party at a moment when South Africa is assuming leadership of the Southern African Development Community and when Pretoria's own published doctrine has made the question before us unusually precise.

On 29 December 2025, responding to the recognition of Somaliland, the Department of International Relations and Cooperation distinguished between “decolonisation and secession” and stated that “the former restores sovereignty; the latter dismantles it.” South Africa also invoked *uti possidetis* and the protection of borders inherited at independence. We do not ask South Africa to abandon that doctrine. We ask South Africa to apply it.


The Matabele nation did not enter Zimbabwe through a voluntary union. There was no treaty of union, no plebiscite by which the people surrendered their sovereignty, and no referendum in which the conquered population consented to the colonial territorial settlement becoming permanent. In *In re Southern Rhodesia* [1919] AC 211, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council treated Lobengula's sovereignty as the starting point of the territorial history and described what occurred in 1893 as conquest. The colonial frontier created around that conquest subsequently passed into the Republic of Zimbabwe without the conquered nation ever being asked to consent to it.

Our argument is therefore straightforward. Applying Pretoria's own distinction, Mthwakazi contends that its claim belongs on the restoration side of the line rather than the dismantling side. We are not asking South Africa to accept that conclusion without examination. South Africa may reject it. If it does, it should identify the legal and historical reason: whether Pretoria considers some later event to have supplied consent, whether it believes the distinction operates differently in this case, or whether



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it maintains that the category of decolonisation was permanently closed by Zimbabwean independence in 1980.

Africa's own human-rights system supplies a framework for examining the question. Article 20 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights recognises the right of peoples to self-determination. In *Katangese Peoples' Congress v Zaire*, the African Commission considered serious human-rights violations and denial of participation in government when addressing the relationship between self-determination and territorial integrity. We do not present that communication as a mechanically binding test for secession. We do say that the Commission identified considerations that Africa itself has regarded as relevant. Those considerations should be applied to Matabeleland and the result stated.

That examination cannot exclude Gukurahundi. Between 1983 and 1987 Zimbabwean state forces killed civilians in Matabeleland and the Midlands. *Breaking the Silence, Building True Peace*, compiled by the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Zimbabwe with the Legal Resources Foundation, conservatively identified at least three thousand dead or missing and stated that the true number could be considerably higher; subsequent estimates commonly place the death toll at approximately twenty thousand. The Chihambakwe Commission investigated these events, yet its report has never been published. More than four decades later, the central findings of a state-appointed inquiry remain withheld.

The African Union has meanwhile taken an emphatic position on inherited borders. At its 39th Ordinary Session in February 2026, the Assembly adopted Assembly/AU/Decl.2(XXXIX), reaffirmed Article 4(b) of the Constitutive Act and the 1964 Cairo principle, and fully endorsed the Peace and Security Council's rejection of Israel's recognition of Somaliland. South Africa adopted the same territorial-integrity position. That makes consistency indispensable. Different histories may properly produce different legal conclusions, but different conclusions require reasons.

Accordingly, the Mthwakazi Republic Party has placed eleven formal written questions before the Chairperson of the African Union Commission, the Chairperson of the Assembly of the African Union, the Government of South Africa and the SADC Secretariat. We are not asking any of those institutions, through those questions, to recognise an independent Mthwakazi. We are asking them to state and apply the rule.


For South Africa, the central questions include:

- Does inherited-border protection attach only to the composite state that emerged from decolonisation, or must the prior status of political entities also be considered?



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- Where no consent to union was ever given, does a border produced by conquest and company annexation attract precisely the same protection as one produced by voluntary agreement?
- Has the African Union ever examined the legal character of the incorporation of the territory of the Matabele nation into Southern Rhodesia after the war of 1893?
- Does Assembly/AU/Decl.2(XXXIX) state a general rule for the continent or a Somalia-specific rule? If it is general, how does it apply to territories taken by conquest rather than voluntary union?
- Why is historical territorial status determinative in South Africa's treatment of Western Sahara, treated differently in the Somaliland question, and still unexamined in relation to Mthwakazi?

We respectfully request a reasoned written response within sixty days of receipt.

South Africa's assumption of the SADC chair makes this an appropriate moment for an answer. Mthwakazi is pursuing this question peacefully. No territory is being seized and no force is being threatened. Documents are being served, Africa's own institutions are being cited, and legal reasoning is being requested. A regional organisation committed to conflict prevention should prefer argument before violence and law before force.


Pretoria wrote the rule on 29 December 2025. The Judicial Committee recorded the conquest. The African Commission identified the relevant considerations. The documentary record records the killings. We have now served the questions.

South Africa may reject our argument. What it should not do is decline to state why.



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Yours faithfully,

Mqondisi Moyo

President

Mthwakazi Republic Party

Office of the President

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In Pursuit of Truth, Justice and Peace During Our Lifetime


Sisonke Sibambene SinguMthwakazi Sesikulungisa!





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12 August 2026

His Excellency Mr Cyril Ramaphosa

President of the Republic of South Africa
Pretoria, Republic of South Africa

The Honourable Ronald Lamola, MP

Minister of International Relations and Cooperation
Republic of South Africa
Pretoria, Republic of South Africa

RE: SOUTH AFRICA'S OWN PLEADINGS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, AND THEIR APPLICATION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

Your Excellency and Honourable Minister,

I write further to two documents issued by the Mthwakazi Republic Party on 10 and 11 August 2026.

On 10 August 2026 the Mthwakazi Republic Party issued Written Questions on the Doctrine of Inherited Borders, addressed to the Chairperson of the African Union Commission, the Chairperson of the Assembly of the African Union, the Department of International Relations and Cooperation, and the Executive Secretary of the Southern African Development Community. On 11 August 2026 I transmitted a signed letter to you both; transmission to addresses within your Department and the Presidency is documented.

Those documents did not request recognition. They said so in terms. They requested that the institutions addressed identify the legal test they apply when a people asserts a claim to sovereign status, and apply that test consistently. They requested a reasoned written reply within sixty days of receipt.

This letter adds one matter, and it is not a matter of Mthwakazi's opinion. It is a matter of South Africa's record.


I. What the Republic of South Africa has told the International Court of Justice

On 1 March 2018, in the advisory proceedings concerning the Separation of the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius, the Government of the Republic of South Africa filed a written statement with the Court (document 169-20180301-WRI-12-00-EN).



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At paragraph 6, South Africa stated that the right to self-determination is a **fundamental human right** and is **regarded as a jus cogens right**. In the accompanying footnote South Africa identified the instruments in which that right finds its roots, and named among them the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights.

At paragraph 60, South Africa stated:

the foundation of decolonization is giving effect to the jus cogens right of peoples to self-determination ... Without self-determination, decolonization cannot be realized.

At paragraph 63, South Africa stated that self-determination existed as **a legal right which could be violated**, and that it has been stated to be a jus cogens right.

At paragraph 4, South Africa described colonialism as **“an archaic remnant of a previous world order that considered some peoples more worthy than others”**. At paragraph 9 it described itself as **“an active and strong proponent of fully realizing the decolonization of all peoples”**.

On 25 July 2023, in the advisory proceedings concerning the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, South Africa filed a further written statement (document 186-20230725-WRI-14-00-EN).

At paragraph 48, South Africa stated that its position was **strengthened by Article 20(1) of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights**, reproducing the Charter's guarantee that all peoples shall have “the unquestionable and inalienable right to self-determination”.

At paragraph 50, South Africa described the right as **inalienable**. At paragraph 51 it characterised the right of self-determination as **“a peremptory or jus cogens norm with an erga omnes character which is the concern of all States”**.

Article 20 of the African Charter is not an invention of this Party. South Africa placed Article 20(1) before the International Court of Justice as authority strengthening the legal right of peoples to self-determination. In the same pleading, South Africa separately characterised that right as peremptory and erga omnes.


The Republic of South Africa and the Republic of Zimbabwe are both States Parties to the African Charter. Neither may treat Article 20 as another continent's instrument.

II. Pretoria's contrary paragraphs, placed on the record by this Party



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This Party will not do to South Africa what has been done to the Matabele nation. We therefore record the passages in South Africa's own pleadings that tell against us, before your Department has occasion to.

At paragraph 75 of the Chagos statement, South Africa pleaded:

regardless of where boundaries existed before colonization, at the time of decolonization, boundaries should remain as they were.

At paragraph 76, South Africa recognised one exception to uti possidetis: agreement between the States concerned. At paragraph 12, South Africa described Mauritius as conquered by Britain in 1810 and thereafter "formally and validly ceded" in 1814.

Those paragraphs are genuine and South Africa is entitled to rely on them. We do not ask you to abandon them, and we do not assert that the international law applicable in 1893 was identical to the law of today. We make no retrospective legal claim about the year 1893.

We say something narrower.

Paragraphs 60 and 75 of that statement, read together, do not answer the Matabele question. They create it.

South Africa says that boundaries inherited at decolonisation should ordinarily survive it. South Africa also says that decolonisation cannot be realised without self-determination. Both propositions cannot be applied to Matabeleland without first identifying who the relevant people is, and what act of self-determination is said to have occurred.

III. The consistency question


The Republic of South Africa has articulated four public positions bearing directly on this subject. Each is on the record and none is disputed here. A fifth case, Mthwakazi, is now before it and has not yet received a reasoned South African position.

- (a) Palestine. South Africa has argued before the International Court of Justice that the Palestinian people hold an inalienable and peremptory right to self-determination.
- (b) Chagos. South Africa has argued before the same Court that the detachment of a territory from a colonial unit violated both uti possidetis and the right of self-determination, and that decolonisation was therefore not lawfully completed.
- (c) Western Sahara. South Africa treats Western Sahara as an unfinished decolonisation question and continues to support the right of the Sahrawi people to self-determination.



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(d) Somaliland. On 26 December 2025 Israel became the first United Nations member State to recognise Somaliland. Three days later, on 29 December 2025, your Department published its distinction between decolonisation, which it said restores sovereignty, and secession, which it said dismantles it, and applied that distinction against the recognition. Somaliland had been a separate colonial territory, attained independence on 26 June 1960, and is described on the African Union's own member-State pages as "the State of Somaliland" at the time of the union of 1 July 1960.

(e) Mthwakazi. South Africa has stated no position at all.

Those four articulated positions, and the unanswered fifth case, cannot be tested for consistency until South Africa states the legal test that produces its conclusions. If the relevant self-determination unit is the colonial territorial unit as it stood at independence, Somaliland was such a unit and had already been a State; South Africa's position on Somaliland then requires a separate explanation. If a territory's status as an unfinished decolonisation question is decisive, South Africa should identify the legal criterion that places Western Sahara within that category and Matabeleland outside it. If neither governs, and the right is engaged by peoplehood and the denial of participation in government, then that test must be stated and applied.

We do not assert that any of those tests produces independence for Mthwakazi. We do not assert that a single test must produce the same outcome in every case. We assert that different outcomes require an identifiable test and stated reasons, and that South Africa has not yet supplied either.

IV. Matabeleland


The Matabele nation did not enter Zimbabwe by agreement. No treaty of union, no instrument of cession or accession, no plebiscite and no referendum has ever been produced. In *In re Southern Rhodesia* [1919] AC 211 the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council — the highest tribunal of the colonial power itself — treated Lobengula's sovereignty as the starting point of the territorial history and described the events of 1893 as conquest. The frontier created around that conquest passed into the Republic of Zimbabwe in 1980 without the conquered nation being asked anything.

Between 1983 and 1987, State forces killed civilians in Matabeleland and the Midlands. *Breaking the Silence, Building True Peace*, compiled by the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Zimbabwe with the Legal Resources Foundation, conservatively identified at least three thousand dead or missing and stated that the true number could be considerably higher; subsequent estimates commonly place the toll at approximately twenty thousand. A commission of inquiry under Justice Chihambakwe was appointed. Its report has never been published.



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In its Chagos statement, at paragraph 83, South Africa told the Court that forced removals of persons, whether within one territory or across international borders, constitute a continuing violation of international human rights law, and stated that it reached that conclusion from its own history.

V. What is requested

South Africa may reject this Party's argument in its entirety. That has been conceded in writing twice, and it is conceded again here. What is requested is a reasoned answer to the following, each of which arises from South Africa's own submissions:

1. Does the Republic of South Africa maintain the position stated at paragraph 60 of its Chagos written statement, that decolonisation cannot be realised without self-determination? If that is no longer its position, when and by what instrument did it change?
2. Does South Africa maintain the position stated at paragraph 48 of its Palestine written statement, that Article 20(1) of the African Charter strengthens the legal right of peoples to self-determination? Does South Africa accept that the Republic of Zimbabwe, as a State Party to the Charter, is bound by Article 20? If so, what legal consequence does South Africa say follows when a people within Zimbabwe invokes that right?
3. By what legal test does South Africa identify the "people" in whom the right of self-determination vests? Please state the test, not the outcome.
4. Applying that test, and stating the result in each case: Palestine, Chagos, Western Sahara, Somaliland, and the Matabele nation.
5. By what act does South Africa say the Matabele nation exercised or satisfied the right described in South Africa's pleadings as inalienable and peremptory? Please identify the instrument, the date, and the population that participated.
6. If no such act is identified, does South Africa contend that the right never applied to the Matabele nation; that it applied and has been satisfied; or that it applied, has not been satisfied, and no consequence follows? Each of those is a legal position, and this Party will accept any of them provided it is stated with its reason.


This supplemental request does not alter the response periods stated in the documents of 10 and 11 August 2026, which continue to run from their respective dates of receipt.

A reasoned written reply to the additional questions in this letter is requested within sixty days of receipt of this letter. Should no reply be received, that fact will be recorded and published together with the date of transmission and the recipients.



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VI. Method


Mthwakazi is pursuing this question peacefully. No territory is being seized. No force is being threatened. No foreign State is asked to recognise anything, and nothing in this letter asks South Africa to act at the instance of any government outside Africa. Documents are being issued and transmitted, African institutions are being cited, and legal reasoning is being requested.

On 17 August President Ramaphosa will host and chair the 46th Summit of the Southern African Development Community in Durban, under a theme that ends with the words "in Pursuit of a Just World". The Matabele nation asks what that phrase means inside the region itself.

The Republic of South Africa went to the International Court of Justice because it believed that grave questions should be answered through law rather than through assertion. This Party agrees. We ask only that the doctrine South Africa pleaded to that Court be stated plainly, and applied.

South Africa may reject our argument. What it should not do is decline to state why.

Yours faithfully,



Mqondisi Moyo

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