

157 Measures, No Independent Judge

Lithuania's 2026 antisemitism plan contains useful projects, conditional funding, and annual reporting. It still lets institutions under challenge help certify the state's own historical record.

By Grant Arthur Gochin

Lithuania's plan has now passed from one government to another without acquiring an independent evaluator. The unresolved question is not how many measures exist, but who has authority to certify performance—and who authorized the Jewish interlocutors whose presence is used publicly.

Current facts and links checked through 4 August 2026.

On 4 August 2026, the verified Facebook account of the Government of Lithuania published a photograph of Prime Minister Mindaugas Sinkevičius meeting Faina Kukliansky and Andrew Baker. The post identified them as the two co-chairs of the Good Will Compensation Foundation for the administration of the immovable property of Jewish religious communities. It said they discussed the foundation's expectations of Lithuania's twenty-first government, the future of the Vilnius Palace of Concerts and Sports, and the arrangement and memorialization of the Šnipiškės Jewish cemetery. The post quoted Sinkevičius saying that historical-memory projects should "unite, not divide." He had used substantially the same formulation on 30 June, when he told Parliament that he would strive to be a prime minister who unites rather than divides. It is his political slogan, not a statement attributed here to either Jewish participant.

The photograph, by itself, establishes neither agreement nor endorsement. It does not disclose what Kukliansky or Baker said. **Nothing in this article is intended as criticism of Faina Kukliansky, and no position is attributed to her.** She is mentioned because the government named and pictured her. The representative-authority inquiry below is directed to Baker's stated capacity and to any later attempt to treat a meeting with him as consent by an entity or constituency not shown in the public record to have authorized him.

The post does place both participants, through the state's own framing, in the public position of Jewish interlocutors on restitution, heritage, and historical memory. Lithuania chose the image, the caption, and the institutional description. That observation concerns the government's public presentation. It is not criticism of Kukliansky and attributes no view, agreement, or conduct to her beyond her attendance and the co-chair title stated by the government.

Baker's public capacity on 4 August was specific. He was identified as a co-chair of the Good Will Foundation. He had retired from AJC on 1 July 2026, while continuing as a Good Will Foundation co-chair, a Claims Conference officer, and the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office's personal representative on combating antisemitism through the end of 2026. Those offices are not interchangeable. The foundation is multi-member and jointly chaired. The question is not whether Baker was entitled to attend. It is what principal, if any, the public record shows he was authorized to represent; what written instrument, if any, records that authority; and the stated scope of that authority.

That question now meets Lithuania's 157-measure action plan against antisemitism, xenophobia, incitement to hatred, and for the fostering of Jewish life. The plan was adopted on [21 January 2026](#) by the twentieth government, led by Prime Minister Inga Ruginienė. It was then inherited by Sinkevičius's twenty-first government, sworn in on 14 July. The state published a [nineteen-page framework](#) and a [thirty-one-page implementation appendix](#). The defect has therefore survived a change of government: no independent evaluator, no external audit of LGGRTC, and no amendment supplying either one.

This article does not dismiss the document without reading it. It audits the full text, revises my earlier account where the implementation appendix supplies material detail, identifies measures that deserve support, and tests the plan against the institutions and cases it leaves unresolved. It also audits my requests to AJC, Baker, and WJRO for transparency. The result is narrower than a claim of conspiracy and more consequential than a claim of mere public relations.

The plan's central defect is not that it contains nothing. It is that Lithuania appoints the implementers, receives their reports, publishes their progress, and leaves no independent institution with authority to conclude that the state failed.

1. The appendix sharpens the problem

In [AJC and Lithuania](#), published on 9 May 2026, I described the plan too narrowly by focusing on the main text rather than the full implementation appendix. The thirty-one-page appendix identifies the Genocide and Resistance Research Centre of Lithuania, LGGRTC, in several implementation roles. The more precise issue is therefore not whether LGGRTC appears in the plan. It is whether an institution whose historical work has been repeatedly challenged should be given operational responsibilities without a prior independent review of that record. This article uses the full appendix and addresses that narrower, documented question.

The government's summary, the general framework, and the implementation appendix perform different functions. The first two state policy and targets. The appendix assigns individual measures, indicators, implementing bodies, participating institutions, and time periods. Any definitive evaluation must read all three layers: the political announcement, the framework, and the implementation table.

Reading the appendix does not weaken the criticism. It reveals a more serious design choice. LGGRTC is not absent. It is entrusted with implementation. The state institution whose Holocaust-memory outputs have drawn public criticism from AJC, IHRA-linked experts, Lithuania's own historical commission, historians, litigants, and descendants is not placed under prior independent review. It is placed inside the machinery that will decide, advise, mark, remove, commemorate, and evaluate.

The question is therefore not "Why did Lithuania forget LGGRTC?" Lithuania did not forget it. The question is why an institution under sustained challenge was made an executor of the cure without first being subjected to an independent examination of the disease.

2. What the 157 measures genuinely do

A serious critique begins by stating the document accurately. The plan is broader than antisemitism. It covers xenophobia, other forms of incitement and discrimination, vulnerable groups, Jewish life, religious freedom, culture, heritage, Holocaust education, victims, and rescuers. Its breadth explains part of the number. "157" does not mean 157 new antisemitism laws or 157 new mechanisms of Jewish historical accountability.

The framework sets a measurable public-attitude target. It attributes the baseline to the U.S.-based Anti-Defamation League's global antisemitism index published in 2025 and states that 48 percent of Lithuanian respondents believed Jews have too much influence over global affairs. Paragraph 19 sets a 2030 target of 40 percent. The target is modest, but it is concrete. A government willing to publish an antisemitic-attitude baseline creates a metric against which it can later be judged.

Measure 1.1 requires proposals for a coordinating institution, to be a ministry and/or a government committee, commission, or working group. Other measures contemplate prosecutor and police coordinators, law-enforcement training, security assessments for Jewish institutions, cooperation with media and platforms, public education, teacher training, museum work, research, cultural projects, preservation of cemeteries and massacre sites, commemoration of victims, and recognition of the Righteous Among the Nations.

The plan contains annual reporting. Implementers must report in writing by 31 March after each year. A government-appointed coordinator is to publish annual information on financing, results, problems, challenges, achieved indicators, and publicity. Any critique claiming the plan contains no reporting mechanism would be inaccurate.

The plan also contains a measure that earlier criticism, including mine, described too categorically. Measure 3.4 calls for draft legislation by the first quarter of 2027 to improve mechanisms for removing public objects that promote totalitarian or authoritarian regimes and to make it easier to revoke “freedom fighter” status or state awards when confirmed facts establish collaboration with repressive structures or participation in the killing of civilians. The measure is not nothing. It is a future legislative promise.

The plan therefore includes useful work. Jewish institutions need security. Teachers need competent material. Holocaust sites require maintenance. Victims’ names should be restored. Museums should be reviewed. Public attitudes should be measured. Officials should be trained. A document is not fraudulent merely because it is incomplete, and a Jewish organization does not become culpable merely by supporting a useful measure.

The criticism begins where the plan claims institutional credibility it has not earned.

3. Why the number 157 misleads

The appendix counts individual events, seminars, translations, exhibitions, studies, recurring commemorations, local projects, proposed evaluations, and actions described as examining possibilities. That is a legitimate administrative method. It is also why the number should not be confused with structural reform.

A teacher seminar and a mechanism capable of correcting a state institution are not equivalent units. A school contest and an independent historical audit are not equivalent units. A museum exhibit and a legal safeguard against selective prosecution are not equivalent units. Counting each as one creates volume without revealing weight.

The financing language is equally important. The plan relies on existing state and municipal appropriations, European Union funds, and other lawful sources. Measures needing additional appropriations are to be implemented only if those appropriations are provided or if managers can find room in other allocations. The plan is not wholly unfunded, but it is not a single ring-fenced 157-measure budget either. Some measures carry institutional owners and dates without a dedicated sum visible in the plan itself.

The annual reporting architecture remains internal. Implementers report to a coordinator appointed by the government. The coordinator recommends changes to implementers and may submit proposals to the government or prime minister. The coordinator publishes the government’s progress account. The plan does not create an external body with compulsory access to records, independent fact-finding authority, protected tenure, a transparent evidentiary standard, and power to issue a finding that binds or formally condemns the state.

Measure 3.12 creates a related presentation problem. It directs Lithuania to prepare a long-term strategy for participation in the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance and rules for its delegation. Professional representation can be useful. But the measure improves how Lithuania organizes and presents its position to IHRA without requiring an independent assessment of the conduct being presented. In the terminology of [Membership by Violation: Lithuania](#), it is a participation measure, not a compliance finding.

Lithuania has created a reporting loop. It has not created an independent judge.

That distinction controls the entire article. A state may report that it held the seminar, erected the sign, translated the book, met the deadline, and spent the allocation. None of those entries decides whether the state historical institution fabricated, minimized, or preserved a false account of a Holocaust collaborator; whether prosecutors applied historical-speech law selectively; or whether a state honor remains because the state’s preferred fact-maker refused the facts.

4. LGGRTC is an implementer, not an institution under audit

Measure 3.1 assigns LGGRTC and municipalities responsibility for decisions concerning public objects under Lithuania's law prohibiting the promotion of totalitarian and authoritarian regimes. Measure 3.2 places LGGRTC inside the identification and marking of rescuers' graves and related sites. Measure 3.4 includes LGGRTC among the institutions involved in drafting the future legislation on the removal of public objects, revocation of legal status, and withdrawal of state awards. Measure 3.11 gives LGGRTC a role in the "Holocaust victims' names live" project. Measure 3.27 makes LGGRTC the principal body analyzing Holocaust exhibitions in municipal museums and recommending whether they should be updated.

These assignments would be unremarkable if LGGRTC were merely a neutral archival institute whose relevant record had never been challenged. It is not. In 2019, [AJC itself declared that it was "deeply troubled"](#) by LGGRTC's defense of Jonas Noreika and quoted Lithuania's own historical commission describing the Centre's arguments as minimization, obfuscation, and in part offensive to the victims. Andrew Baker said no one could claim ignorance about Lithuanian collaborators. Silvia Foti, Noreika's granddaughter, has since supplied a descendant's evidentiary refusal. In [When Rescuer Becomes a Distortion](#), [The Signature That Still Haunts Lithuania](#), and [What Lithuania Did With the Signature](#), she addresses the transformation of documentary responsibility into a rescue narrative. That is the [Foti Doctrine](#): a rescuer narrative cannot be used to launder documented perpetrator responsibility. Her work is not a government judgment, but it is evidence that the state's preferred historical institution cannot be treated as uncontested.

The plan does not order an independent examination of LGGRTC's published Noreika memoranda, its claimed American "exoneration" of Juozas Ambrazevičius-Brazaitis, its treatment of Adolfas Ramanauskas-Vanagas, its public language toward Jewish critics, or its role in active historical-speech prosecutions. It assigns LGGRTC new tasks.

This is the plan's institutional inversion. The body that requires examination participates in deciding what should be removed, who should be memorialized, which museum exhibits require correction, and when facts are sufficiently "confirmed" to support revocation of honors. The plan does not say that LGGRTC alone controls these decisions. It does not need to. Giving a contested institution a formal place inside the process without an external audit preserves its ability to shape the state's definition of correction.

AJC cannot credibly plead lack of notice. Its own 2019 statement identified the problem. AJC helped create or participate in the international historical-commission architecture through which Baker engaged Lithuania. If AJC later presents the 157-measure plan, hosts discussion of it, or continues private diplomacy, the public question is not whether AJC ever criticized Lithuania. It did. The question is whether it tested the new plan against the institutional defect it had already named.

5. Measure 3.4 is a promissory note, not a completed correction

Measure 3.4 deserves exact treatment. It calls for legislation. It does not itself remove an object, revoke a legal status, withdraw an award, or decide a historical case. Its indicator is the preparation of draft laws. Its deadline is the first quarter of 2027.

The measure does not name Noreika, Škirpa, Brazaitis, Krikštaponis, Ramanauskas, or any other contested figure. It does not define the procedure by which "confirmed facts" will be established. It does not identify an independent tribunal. It does not explain how conflicts of evidence will be resolved when LGGRTC, historians, courts, descendants, and foreign institutions disagree. It does not prevent a state institution from defining the absence of a criminal conviction as absence of historical responsibility.

The absence of names is not automatically a defect in a general action plan. General legislation should often be drafted generally. Here, however, Lithuania has spent years insisting that the disputes are about evidence, not principle. A credible plan could have required a public inventory of contested state honors and historical claims, an independent evidentiary panel, disclosure of the records examined, publication of majority and dissenting findings, and deadlines for applying the new law to existing cases. It does none of those things.

Measure 3.4 can become important. It can also become another entry marked “draft prepared” while the protected register remains untouched. The plan offers no consequence if the legislation stalls, if the standard is designed around the state’s preferred narratives, or if implementation never reaches a named figure.

The accurate sentence is not “the plan does nothing about honors.” The accurate sentence is: the plan promises future legislation, removes no named honor now, and leaves the fact-finding architecture unresolved.

6. The Fridman test

Artur Fridman is the live contradiction the plan does not confront. The public chronology begins with his Facebook post of 9 May 2024 concerning the state-honored figure Adolfas Ramanauskas-Vanagas. A written pledge restricting his departure was imposed on 8 January 2025. Prosecutor Kristina Minko of the First Division of the Vilnius District Prosecutor’s Office, within the Vilnius Regional Prosecutor’s Office, signed a **220-page indictment** on 30 October 2025 in Criminal Case No. 02-2-00512-24. The Lithuanian government’s written confirmation of 13 April 2026 placed the case before the Vilnius City District Court as of that date. The prosecution invokes Article 170² §1, Lithuania’s historical-speech provision, and Article 313 §2. I located no publicly accessible later disposition in the sources reviewed through 4 August 2026. I have set out the public record in [The Prosecution of Artur Fridman](#), [The Prosecution’s Own Evidence](#), and [Why Lithuania Prosecutes a Jew for May 9](#).

Michael Kretzmer reached the institutional question from a different direction in [Lithuania has put itself, not Artur Fridman, on trial](#). Eugene J. Levin examined the use of LGGRTC in the case in [The Court That Already Disqualified the Witness](#). These are advocacy analyses, not court judgments. They identify the test the plan should have anticipated: can Lithuania credibly claim to protect Jewish life and historical truth while making a Jewish citizen defend historical speech inside the state’s existing memory apparatus?

The framework discusses Criminal Code Article 170² as part of Lithuania’s legal protection against denial or gross trivialization of international crimes and Nazi or Soviet crimes. That symmetry is part of what I have called the **Genocide Equalization Doctrine**: Nazi and Soviet crimes are placed inside one speech-control architecture, while the enforcement record must still be tested for viewpoint neutrality. The plan does not order a review of the provision’s application. It does not examine whether the statute has been invoked symmetrically against state Holocaust distortion and against critics of state-honored figures. It does not create a safeguard for good-faith historical debate, an independent review mechanism, or a reporting category for selective enforcement. The resulting question is developed in [The Selective Enforcement Index](#).

Fridman’s guilt or innocence is not decided by this action plan. The plan’s credibility can still be tested against his case. A national antisemitism strategy that catalogs speech, training, commemorations, and institutional cooperation while remaining silent on a live Jewish historical-speech prosecution has omitted the point at which government power touches the individual Jew.

7. Lithuania wrote a stronger Jewish-rights plan in 1919

The 2026 plan is not Lithuania's first expansive Jewish-policy promise. On 5 August 1919, the Lithuanian Delegation to the Paris Peace Conference gave the Committee of Jewish Delegations an eight-point undertaking. It recognized members of the Jewish nation and promised civic, political, and national rights; proportional representation; participation in government and justice; language rights; protection of the Sabbath and festivals; autonomous communal institutions; legal personality; taxing authority; and proportional state subsidies. A Ministry for Jewish Affairs had been created. The closing language revealed the transaction. Lithuania asked Jewish representatives to prefer rights accepted voluntarily to rights imposed by constraint. The state was seeking recognition. It wanted credit for a voluntary guarantee rather than a compulsory minority treaty.

The promise was repeatedly reaffirmed. Before Lithuania's admission to the League of Nations, the League rapporteur recorded a 14 September 1921 undertaking that Lithuania was prepared to adhere to the Assembly's minority-protection recommendation and negotiate the scope and execution of its international obligations. Lithuania entered the League days later. Leo Motzkin then filed the Jewish record and warned of agitation in Lithuanian antisemitic circles.

Lithuania also certified its own success. In Council Document P.4, Augustinas Voldemaras told the League that equality had been guaranteed and realized in practice from the first days of the restored state; that Jews participated freely in the Seim, Army, and state institutions; that Jewish schools operated under equal conditions; and that the Minister of Jewish Affairs worked with energy and success.

The domestic record narrowed the promise. In the 1922 elections, three prominent public lawyers concluded that Lithuania's interpretation of the remainder-seat rules lacked statutory basis and distorted proportional representation. On 19 December 1924, the Seimas adopted commission language expressly "excluding the minorities." Jewish nominees were told there was no place. On 31 March 1925, the Seimas replaced the Jewish Communities Law and rejected the proposed Jewish National Council.

Jewish, Polish, and German deputies then challenged eleven claims Lithuania's representative had made in Geneva. They supplied statutes, dates, parliamentary records, and administrative cases. The League's internal process sent the rebuttal to Lithuania's representative "for information." The evidence could be received, circulated, and filed without producing a reasoned decision on the underlying dispute.

Eugene Levin has reconstructed the autonomy period in [Europe's First Jewish Autonomy Lasted Five Years](#). The larger archival record is not invoked to claim one uninterrupted Lithuanian policy across democratic, authoritarian, Nazi, Soviet, and restored-independence periods. Those legal and political orders were not identical. The recurring structure is narrower: promise, self-certification, domestic narrowing, Jewish documentation, and an institution capable of receiving the record without deciding against the state.

League of Nations document **C.95.M.54.1921.VII**, "Report by M. Hymans on the Conference at Brussels, 20 April–3 June 1921," Annex 4, preserves two draft schemes submitted by the Lithuanian delegation on 30 May 1921 under Ernestas Galvanauskas's signature. During the negotiations over Vilna, Lithuania proposed minority-language rights, elected representative bodies, public funding, and League guarantees for Polish-speaking citizens. The submission was a negotiating draft, not a ratified treaty, not enacted law, and not a promise to Jews. It does not itself prove breach. Its relevance is notice, institutional capacity, declared standard, and instrumental deployment: Lithuania was capable of proposing external supervision of minority protections when that architecture advanced a state objective. Independent scrutiny is therefore not alien to Lithuanian sovereignty. It is present in Lithuania's own diplomatic record. The same Paul Hymans appears in outgoing League correspondence concerning Motzkin's Jewish memorial in January 1922, linking the two files without collapsing their distinct legal status.

The 2026 plan repeats the missing institution. The League had no effective independent adjudicator willing to decide the Jewish record. The new plan has a government-appointed coordinator and internal implementers. Lithuania again possesses a process for documenting activity without a body whose legitimacy depends on saying, when the record requires it: Lithuania did not perform.

8. AJC's own public record complicates its defense

AJC is not a stranger to national action plans. Its 2026 [playbook for governments and diplomats](#) recommends national plans and a coordinating point person. AJC is entitled to favor that model. It is also entitled to pursue private diplomacy. A private meeting does not, by itself, certify a government. AJC's public response to Lithuania's plan was not uncritical. In correspondence I reviewed, Baker forwarded AJC's public statement appreciating the adoption of a national strategy while saying the plan proposed "virtually no new initiatives." The statement both welcomed the adoption of a national strategy and criticized the absence of meaningful new initiatives.

Those facts must be included. Omitting them would turn criticism into a false claim that AJC simply applauded the plan. It did not. AJC criticized the plan's lack of novelty and has publicly criticized Lithuanian Holocaust distortion before.

The unanswered issue is what followed. Lithuania's Foreign Ministry reported that on **14 February 2026**, Foreign Minister Kęstutis Budrys [presented the plan to AJC CEO Ted Deutch at the Munich Security Conference](#). AJC Los Angeles then hosted a private presentation by Lithuanian representatives on 1 May. The public record contains no AJC measure-by-measure audit, no published due-diligence file, no report of the questions asked and answers received, and no explanation of how the plan's assignments to LGGRTC were reconciled with AJC's 2019 criticism of that institution.

Private diplomacy may produce results that cannot be disclosed immediately. That possibility is not proof that it did. When Lithuania uses the relationship publicly, complete secrecy shifts the public benefit to Lithuania. The state receives the photograph and the fact of Jewish institutional access. The Jewish public receives an assurance that important questions are being handled somewhere it cannot see.

Baker's AJC role ended before the 4 August meeting. AJC honored his more than forty-seven years of service at [AJC Global Forum 2026](#), and his last day was 1 July 2026. AJC's [biography page](#) carries both at once: a header line dating his service as Director of International Jewish Affairs from June 1979 to July 2026, and a body still written in the present tense. Baker's own [2017 testimony to the House Judiciary Committee](#) says he had served in that specific directorship since 2002. This is not evidence of wrongdoing. It is an internal documentary inconsistency about the office whose authority must now be identified precisely.

AJC's own [Lithuania page](#) describes a relationship centered on friendship, restitution, and historical memory and has emphasized Baker's repeated contact with senior Lithuanian officials. AJC's biography states that he served on government commissions examining Holocaust-era history and victims' claims, co-chairs the Lithuanian Good Will Foundation, is a long-time Claims Conference officer, and was decorated by the President of Lithuania in 2006. Those facts establish access, duration, and institutional responsibility. They do not establish misconduct. They also do not establish a popular mandate from Litvaks or their descendants. A government commission appointment is not a popular election, and a state decoration is evidence of relationship, not representative authority.

AJC can speak for AJC through officers or agents it authorizes. Baker can speak through each continuing office that authorizes him. **After 1 July, his attendance cannot be attributed to AJC merely because he spent forty-seven years there.** Nor does an AJC mission statement, a government commission appointment, an OSCE appointment, a Claims Conference office, or a Good Will Foundation co-chairmanship automatically create a mandate from every Litvak descendant. A state decoration is evidence of relationship, not evidence of misconduct and not a grant of Jewish representative authority.

9. The transparency audit: six requests, eight documented contacts

I asked how many times I had requested transparency from Baker, AJC, and WJRO. The defensible answer is not a lifetime total. My correspondence refers to private approaches over years, but I have not completed an audit of every historical email and conversation. The present count is a conservative audit of the concentrated written campaign surrounding the May 1 presentation and the 157-measure plan.

Between 19 and 29 April 2026, I made **six discrete written accountability or transparency requests**. They asked AJC to reconsider the event; sought independent documentary access if it proceeded; demanded the record in a public article transmitted to AJC leadership; asked Baker directly about cancellation and the Fridman issue; submitted seven enumerated questions and requested a public report of answers or refusals; and requested written institutional positions from Baker, AJC, WJRO, and other relevant actors.

The broader count is **eight documented contacts** if the 16 April formal notice and transmission of Congressman Brad Sherman's letter and the 9 May transmission/publication of [AJC and Lithuania](#) are included. Appendix B states the method and dates. It does not count repeated recipients inside one message as separate requests, and it does not appropriate another person's separate financial-transparency campaign as mine.

It would be inaccurate to say there was no response of any kind. Baker forwarded AJC's public statement. That communication was a response, but it was not a complete answer to the questions submitted.

The reviewed correspondence contains no itemized written response to the seven questions, no disclosed due-diligence file, and no public report of what Lithuania was asked, what it answered, and what it refused. I located no substantive WJRO response to the institutional-function and Fridman questions in the reviewed threads as of 4 August 2026.

The correspondence record supports a narrower formulation: AJC did reply, but I did not locate a complete written response to the enumerated questions or a published account of what was asked and answered at the meeting.

The seven questions concerned the Fridman prosecution, LGGRTC's operational role, the claimed American exoneration of Brazaitis, LGGRTC's Noreika rescue narrative, Article 170² asymmetry, removal of honors, and whether AJC would publicly report what it asked and what Lithuania answered or refused. They were not questions about private motive. They were requests for institutional positions on a public record.

I do not contend that a Jewish institution has a legal duty to answer every critic. My point is one of public credibility. When an institution presents itself as a global Jewish interlocutor, maintains long access to a government, participates in restitution and historical commissions, and hosts a state presentation of an antisemitism plan, the existence or absence of a documented response to specific questions is relevant to how readers assess its public claims.

10. Baker's representative authority: identify the principal, instrument, and scope

No agreement is known to have resulted from the 4 August meeting. I am not a lawyer, and the discussion that follows is not a legal opinion about the validity or effect of any agreement. It is a request for documentary clarity if Lithuania or any institution later describes the meeting as producing an agreement, undertaking, assent, or common position. Baker was identified as a co-chair of the Good Will Foundation, not as an AJC officer; his AJC service had ended five weeks earlier. The meeting concerned the foundation's expectations, the Sports Palace, and the Šnipiškės cemetery. His continuing Good Will Foundation, Claims Conference, and OSCE roles are distinct and should not be treated as one undifferentiated source of representative authority.

The foundation grew out of negotiations over compensation for prewar Jewish religious communal immovable property and has a genuine governance structure. Its published board includes Lithuanian Jewish communal leaders and persons associated with the Claims Conference, WJRO, B'nai B'rith International, and the Litvak Association in Israel. Its institutional purpose concerns compensation, support for Jewish communal life, and related heritage purposes in Lithuania. Nothing in this section questions Kukliansky's participation as the other co-chair or attributes any agreement, statement, or failure to her. The narrower question is what the public record shows Baker, or any participant, was authorized to represent beyond the named foundation and the subject matter of the meeting.

A mandate of that kind may support negotiations about compensation, property, cemeteries, memorialization, and projects. The published description of the mandate does not, by itself, show that the foundation or either co-chair was authorized to speak for every descendant of Lithuanian Jewry on the historical record, the credibility of LGGRTC, the prosecution of a Jewish citizen, or whether Lithuania has reconciled with its past.

The present-day Lithuanian Jewish community, religious bodies in Lithuania, international restitution organizations, heirs and descendants abroad, Holocaust survivors, descendants of murdered communities, AJC members, and Litvaks generally are overlapping constituencies. They are not interchangeable. A board seat in one structure does not silently aggregate all of them.

The concern is disclosed authority, not personal criticism. I am not a lawyer. The English-language text of Article 2.136 of the [Civil Code of the Republic of Lithuania](#) states that a transaction concluded in another person's name without express authorization, or beyond the authority granted, creates, modifies, or extinguishes the principal's rights and obligations only if the principal later approves the transaction or the part exceeding that authority; later approval makes it valid from the date it was concluded. I cite the provision only to identify why the authorization and approval record would matter if an agreement were ever asserted. I do not apply Article 2.136 to the 4 August meeting or to any communication arising from it; I do not characterize either as a legal transaction; and I offer no conclusion that any actual or hypothetical agreement is valid, invalid, binding, void, or enforceable. If an agreement is later said to have arisen from the 4 August meeting, readers should be shown the entity said to have agreed; Baker's exact office at the time; any resolution, delegation, bylaws provision, power of attorney, or other instrument relied upon; the subject matter and limits of that authority; any required approval by the other co-chair or board; and the constituency, if any, said to be represented. An agreement made within the Good Will Foundation's mandate might concern that foundation. The public record of the meeting, standing alone, would not establish that AJC after Baker's retirement, WJRO, the Claims Conference, the Lithuanian Jewish Community, diaspora descendants, or Litvaks generally had agreed to anything.

A signature does not by itself establish a constituency. A title does not by itself establish a mandate. Before a meeting or document can reasonably be presented as evidence of broader Jewish consent, the public record should identify the principal, the authority relied upon, the scope of that authority, and any approval or ratification required.

WJRO's role should be described with the same restraint. WJRO is entitled to negotiate restitution and advocate on property claims. My April 29 request asked for its institutional function and public position on the Fridman issue. It did not accuse WJRO of financial misconduct. Separate requests by Rabbi Sholom Krinsky for financial disclosure over a much longer period are his record, not mine, and are not counted as my transparency requests in this article.

"Unite, not divide" is the prime minister's phrase and a reuse of his investiture rhetoric. It is not attributed here to Baker or Kukliansky. Historical truth often divides before it reconciles. A government cannot define unity as the absence of public disagreement and then cite a private meeting as proof that Jewish issues are being responsibly resolved.

11. The record is larger than one writer

The demand for scrutiny does not rest on my writing alone. Eugene J. Levin asked direct institutional questions in [Questions for AJC and B'nai B'rith](#), then addressed the relationship in [AJC and Lithuania's Fraud](#) and the policy document in [Lithuania's Antisemitism Resolution Is Orwellian Fraud](#). His language is his own. The institutional questions overlap because the public record overlaps.

Silvia Foti writes from perpetrator-descendant standing that no Jewish organization can manufacture for her and no Lithuanian institution can erase. Her Noreika work tests whether the plan's heritage and rescuer provisions distinguish commemoration from exculpation. Michael Kretzmer's Fridman article tests whether the plan reaches current state power. The convergence is not proof that every assertion is correct. It defeats the claim that the unresolved issues are a private grievance invented by one litigant.

My related public record includes [To Jewish Leaders: Read Before You Go](#), [AJC & B'nai B'rith: The Jewish Community Is Entitled to the Record](#), [Are Jewish organizations doing their due diligence?](#), [Lithuania Closes the Loop](#), [The Procedural Dismissal Catalogue](#), [The Selective Enforcement Index](#), and [Membership by Violation: Lithuania](#).

Those pieces are not substitutes for the plan. This article links them so the reader can inspect the underlying claims rather than accept a compressed accusation. The same rule should govern AJC, WJRO, the Good Will Foundation, and Lithuania: publish the record that supports the institutional position.

12. What a credible 157-measure plan would add

The plan can still become useful. Its current architecture needs six additions.

An independent evaluator

The evaluator must sit outside the ministries and outside LGGRTC, have protected independence, receive records, hear competing experts and affected families, publish reasoned findings, preserve dissent, and possess authority to conclude that a state institution failed. Advice to the government is not enough. Annual self-reporting is not enough.

A public measure-level dashboard

Each measure should show the responsible official, budget source and amount, start date, deadline, current status, documentary proof of completion, indicator, expenditure, obstacle, and corrective action. The existing annual publication requirement should become a live accountability instrument rather than a yearly narrative prepared inside the same system.

A named historical-record review

A general plan should not become a list of politically selected enemies. It can still require an inventory of contested honors, titles, plaques, memorials, and state historical claims, including the documents relied upon, the objections received, and the status of review. Noreika, Škirpa, Brazaitis, Krikštaponis, Ramanauskas, and other protected figures should not remain outside scrutiny because naming them is uncomfortable.

A review of Article 170² enforcement

The government should publish the history of referrals, investigations, refusals, charges, and outcomes under the historical-speech provision, with anonymization where law requires. An external legal panel should examine consistency, viewpoint neutrality, and safeguards for good-faith historical argument. The Fridman case cannot be administratively erased, but the system that produced it can be audited.

A lawful, independent path for measure 3.4

The promised legislation should define “confirmed facts,” establish who decides them, require disclosure of the evidentiary record, prevent LGRTC from acting as sole or controlling fact-maker in disputes involving its own publications, provide notice and appeal, and compel application to existing honors within a fixed period. “Draft prepared” should not count as historical correction.

Jewish institutional due diligence and mandate disclosure

AJC, WJRO, the Good Will Foundation, B’nai B’rith, and any other institution publicly presented as a Jewish interlocutor should publish the scope of its mandate, the materials reviewed, the questions posed, the government’s answers, unresolved disagreements, and the constituencies it does not claim to represent. If an agreement is invoked, the public record should identify the entity said to have agreed, the signatory, the authority relied upon, its scope, and any further approval said to be required. Confidential operational details can remain protected. The existence of due diligence and the claimed basis of representative authority should be capable of public verification.

13. The judgment

Lithuania’s action plan is not empty. It is not self-executing. It contains projects worth supporting, mechanisms worth improving, and a future legislative promise that should be enforced. Its public-attitude target, security measures, education work, heritage projects, and annual reporting can produce value.

The plan does not resolve the credibility problem it was presented to answer. It was adopted by the twentieth government and inherited by the twenty-first without an independent evaluator or an external audit of LGRTC. The state appoints the coordinator. State institutions implement the measures. LGRTC, already challenged on the public record, receives multiple roles. The future honors measure lacks a completed fact-finding architecture. The Fridman prosecution and Article 170² asymmetry remain outside the instrument. Jewish institutional access remains more visible than publicly documented Jewish institutional due diligence. Any later claim of broader agreement would need to be assessed against the actual authority disclosed for the person or entity said to have agreed. The 1919 promise was larger. Lithuania certified its own success then too. Jewish representatives documented the gap. The international process received the evidence and avoided the judgment. One hundred and seven years later, the missing office has not changed.

Show the record. Show the mandate. Show the institution that can say Lithuania failed.

Appendix A — Selected accountability audit of the plan

This is not a summary of all 157 measures. It selects measures that bear directly on institutional accountability, historical memory, enforcement, funding, and public verification. “Remaining defect” is an evaluative conclusion based on the text of the plan, not a claim about undisclosed private action.

Measure	What the text does	Genuine value	Remaining defect
Framework ¶19 (framework PDF p. 18)	Sets 2030 public-attitude targets, including reducing the share believing Jews have excessive global influence from 48% to 40%.	Creates a measurable outcome.	Does not measure state historical accuracy, selective enforcement, or institutional accountability.
Framework ¶20 (framework PDF p. 18)	Uses state/municipal appropriations, EU funds, and other lawful sources; additional-funding actions proceed if funds are allocated or otherwise available.	Identifies lawful funding channels.	No single measure-level appropriation ledger appears in the plan; conditional funding can delay execution.
Framework ¶¶22–24 (framework PDF pp. 18–19)	Annual reports by implementers; annual public information by the government-appointed coordinator.	Creates reporting and publication duties.	Internal loop; no external evaluator or binding consequence for failure.
1.1 (appendix p. 1)	Appoint a coordinating institution: ministry and/or government committee, commission, or working group.	Creates a focal point.	Coordinator remains government-appointed; independence and powers are undefined.
1.2 / related law-enforcement measures (appendix pp. 1–2)	Develop prosecutor/police coordination and training.	Can improve consistency and capacity.	No published audit of Article 170 ² selective enforcement is required.
1.7 / security measures (appendix p. 3)	Assess threats and coordinate protection of Jewish institutions.	Addresses physical security.	Does not address historical-memory institutions or speech prosecutions.
3.1 (appendix pp. 20–21)	LGGRTC and municipalities act on prohibited totalitarian/authoritarian public objects.	Creates an implementation route for removals.	LGGRTC is an implementer despite unresolved challenges to its own historical outputs.
3.2 (appendix p. 21)	LGGRTC helps identify and mark rescuers’ graves and related sites.	Preserves rescuer memory.	No independent safeguard against rescue narratives being used to minimize perpetrator responsibility.
3.4 (appendix pp. 21–22)	Draft legislation by Q1 2027 to ease removal of objects and revocation of status/awards when confirmed facts show collaboration or civilian killings.	Acknowledges a structural legal problem.	No honor is removed by the plan; no cases named; “confirmed facts” and independent decision process undefined; LGGRTC participates.

Measure	What the text does	Genuine value	Remaining defect
3.11 (appendix pp. 25–26)	LGGRTC and the Government Chancellery implement victim-name memorial boards.	Names and local communities can be restored to public memory.	Victim commemoration does not audit perpetrator exculpation.
3.12 (appendix p. 26)	Prepare long-term IHRA participation strategy and delegation rules.	Can clarify representation and objectives.	No requirement for independent assessment of Lithuania's compliance with the record it presents to IHRA.
3.27 (appendix p. 31)	LGGRTC analyzes municipal Holocaust exhibitions and recommends updates.	Museum quality can improve.	Contested institution becomes reviewer of others without first undergoing external review.

Appendix B — Transparency-request chronology and count

Method: one communication event counts once, regardless of the number of recipients. The narrow count includes messages whose operative purpose was a request for action, disclosure, access, an institutional position, or public reporting. The broad count adds formal notice/transmission events that placed the underlying record before the institutions. This is a review of the April–May 2026 campaign, not a lifetime total.

Date	Classification	Institution(s)	Request or notice	Response status as reviewed
16 Apr 2026	Formal notice / transmission	AJC/Baker and WJRO-related recipient included	Congressman Brad Sherman’s letter and underlying record transmitted.	Broad count only.
19 Apr 2026	Request 1	AJC Los Angeles	Cancel or reconsider the May 1 presentation after due-diligence concerns.	No cancellation.
22 Apr 2026	Request 2	AJC Los Angeles	If event proceeded, permit independent documentary recording/access.	Access not granted.
24 Apr 2026	Request 3	AJC leadership/Baker	Public article demanding the record before the event.	No disclosed due-diligence file.
24 Apr 2026	Request 4	Baker/AJC	Directly ask whether AJC would cancel and address Fridman.	Baker forwarded AJC public statement; no itemized answer.
27 Apr 2026	Request 5	AJC Los Angeles/leadership	Seven enumerated questions; ask that answers/refusals be recorded and publicly reported.	General response on dialogue; no itemized written answer or public report located.
29 Apr 2026	Request 6	Baker/AJC, WJRO and related institutional actors	Request written institutional functions/positions, including Fridman.	No substantive WJRO answer located in reviewed threads.
9 May 2026	Transmission / public notice	Baker/AJC and public record	Publication/transmission of comprehensive “AJC and Lithuania” article.	Broad count only.

Conservative result: six discrete requests. **Broader documentary-contact result:** eight events when the 16 April and 9 May notice/transmission events are added. The reviewed correspondence contains general AJC responses, but no complete itemized answer to the seven questions, no disclosed due-diligence file, and no public report of the May 1 meeting as of 4 August 2026.

Appendix C — Government of Lithuania Facebook post, 4 August 2026



Full-width screenshot supplied on 4 August 2026 from the verified Government of Lithuania account. Facebook displays a relative “4h” timestamp; retain the original capture and permalink in the publication archive.

Author’s English translation

“Prime Minister Mindaugas Sinkevičius met Faina Kukliansky and Andrew Baker, the co-chairs of the board of the Good Will Compensation Foundation for the administration of the immovable property of Jewish religious communities. At the meeting, the foundation’s expectations for the twenty-first Government were presented, and current issues were discussed, including adaptation of the Vilnius Concert and Sports Palace and the arrangement and memorialization of the territory of the Šnipiškės Jewish cemetery. As Prime Minister Sinkevičius emphasized, any historical-memory projects must unite, not divide. The Prime Minister assured them that the Government is and will remain open to seeking solutions in accordance with the principles of dialogue and cooperation.”

Direct share link: [Government Facebook post](#). The Lithuanian legal name contains “disponavimo,” rendered here as “administration”; “disposal” is another possible literal rendering in property-law usage. The translation is the author’s and is provided to convey the substance of the government post.

Appendix D — Linked reading and source network

The article should be published on Substack with the hyperlinks retained. The PDF can then function as a stable linked source for a shorter Times of Israel pointer article.

Official plan and institutional sources

- [Government announcement adopting 157 measures](#)
- [Nineteen-page plan framework](#)
- [Thirty-one-page implementation appendix](#)
- [Lithuanian Foreign Ministry: Budrys presents plan to AJC](#)
- [AJC Lithuania page](#)
- [Andrew Baker biography](#)
- [AJC tribute to Andrew Baker's forty-seven-year career](#)
- [Baker testimony to the House Judiciary Committee, 7 November 2017](#)
- [JNS report on Baker's 1 July 2026 AJC retirement and continuing roles](#)
- [Lithuanian Civil Code, Article 2.136](#)
- [Good Will Foundation board](#)
- [AJC 2019 criticism of LGGRTC/Noreika defense](#)

Grant Arthur Gochin

- [AJC and Lithuania](#)
- [I Was Not the First to File — Lithuanian Jewish Community publication](#)
- [To Jewish Leaders: Read Before You Go](#)
- [AJC & B'nai B'rith: The Jewish Community Is Entitled to the Record](#)
- [Are Jewish organizations doing their due diligence?](#)
- [Lithuania Closes the Loop](#)
- [The Prosecution of Artur Fridman](#)
- [The Prosecution's Own Evidence](#)
- [Why Lithuania Prosecutes a Jew for May 9](#)
- [The Procedural Dismissal Catalogue](#)
- [The Selective Enforcement Index](#)
- [Membership by Violation: Lithuania](#)
- [Unknown Rescuers, Unreliable Custodians](#)
- [The Foti Doctrine](#)
- [The Brazaitis Fraud](#)

Eugene J. Levin

- [Questions for AJC and B'nai B'rith](#)
- [AJC and Lithuania's Fraud](#)
- [Lithuania's Antisemitism Resolution Is Orwellian Fraud](#)
- [Europe's First Jewish Autonomy Lasted Five Years](#)
- [The Court That Already Disqualified the Witness](#)
- [The Silence Lithuania Chose](#)
- [Lithuania Commemorates the Genocide It Refuses to Name](#)

Silvia Foti

- [When Rescuer Becomes a Distortion](#)
- [The Signature That Still Haunts Lithuania](#)

- [What Lithuania Did With the Signature](#)

Michael Kretzmer

- [Lithuania has put itself, not Artur Fridman, on trial](#)

Appendix E — Questions for the public record

The following questions identify the records that would allow readers to test the institutional claims discussed in this article. They do not presume that an agreement was made, that any person exceeded an authority, or that any institution acted improperly. Each recipient should be given the same stated deadline for response. Any substantive response received by that deadline can be reproduced or linked alongside the article. Silence should be described only after the deadline expires.

To the Government of Lithuania

- Which institution has been appointed, or will be appointed, under measure 1.1, and what safeguards ensure its independence?
- What budget is assigned to each of the 157 measures, beyond ordinary appropriations and conditional additional funding?
- Will the annual reports publish measure-level expenditure, evidence of completion, delays, and corrective action?
- What independent process will examine LGGRTC's own disputed Holocaust-history outputs before it implements measures 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.11, and 3.27?
- How will "confirmed facts" be defined and adjudicated under the legislation contemplated by measure 3.4?
- Does the government intend to review Article 170² enforcement and the Fridman case for consistency with the plan?

To AJC

- What materials did AJC review before Ted Deutch's 14 February Munich engagement and the May 1 Los Angeles meeting?
- What specific questions did AJC ask Lithuania about LGGRTC, Fridman, Article 170², Noreika, Brazaitis, Ramanauskas, and measure 3.4?
- What answers were received, and which matters remain disputed?
- Will AJC publish a measure-by-measure due-diligence assessment of the plan?
- Did AJC authorize Andrew Baker to represent it in any Lithuania-related matter after his 1 July 2026 retirement? If so, identify the written authority and its scope.
- Does AJC claim any mandate to speak for Litvak descendants generally?

To Andrew Baker

- In exactly which capacity did you attend the 4 August meeting?
- What entity, if any, did you understand yourself to represent at the meeting, and what record, if any, documents that role and its scope?
- Did you understand the 4 August meeting to produce any agreement, undertaking, representation, or common position? If so, what entity did you understand yourself to represent, what was the subject matter, and what further approval, if any, was contemplated?
- In which capacity or capacities, if any, were you acting with respect to AJC after 1 July 2026, WJRO, the Claims Conference, the Lithuanian Jewish Community, diaspora Litvak descendants, or Litvaks generally?
- Is there an authorizing instrument, set of minutes, or written account of any position reached at the meeting that can be published?

To WJRO and the Good Will Foundation

- What is the scope of each institution's mandate concerning restitution, heritage, cemeteries, historical memory, and current criminal or historical-speech cases?
- Did either institution provide Baker with written authority concerning the 4 August meeting? If so, what was its scope and what approval process applied?

- Did either institution understand Baker to be expressing a position on its behalf at the 4 August meeting? If so, what record defines the subject matter, scope, and approval process?
- Did either institution take a position on the Fridman prosecution or on LGGRTC's role in the 157-measure plan?
- Will minutes, resolutions, authorizations, or written positions from the 4 August meeting be published?

Scope note: This article addresses public documents, institutional roles, representative claims, and the public record of disclosed authority. It does not allege corruption, financial misconduct, conspiracy, or personal bad faith. No criticism of Faina Kukliansky is intended or implied; she is mentioned only because the Government post identifies her as a participant and co-chair. No agreement is known to have resulted from the meeting, and no opinion is offered on the legal validity or effect of any actual or hypothetical agreement.