




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Office of the President
Mthwakazi Republic Party
Statement by the President

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

The ANC Has Betrayed Africa

Issued by Hon. Mqondisi Moyo, President of the Mthwakazi Republic Party

Bulawayo, Mthwakazi — 20 July 2026

The charge

The African National Congress has spent moral credit earned not by the party alone, but by an entire continent that sheltered it, armed it, educated its exiles and sustained its struggle. That account is now overdrawn. It was not emptied by Washington, by Jerusalem, by mining money, or by a foreign writer. It was emptied at Beitbridge, in police cells, at clinic doors where African women were turned away by men demanding papers. The party that Africa carried has presided over Africans being driven out of Africa. I say only what the record supports, and much of the decisive record I rely on was published by the South African government itself.

The Mthwakazi Republic Party makes no complaint against South Africans. Ordinary South Africans did not draft these policies and are not the authors of the ruin that pushed our people south in the first place. Many of them sheltered our families for thirty years. Many of them are today the poorest people in the country and have been handed a foreigner to blame for it. The nation is not the party. Our indictment is against a governing party, the officials who authorised, implemented or knowingly tolerated the conduct, and the state machinery for which they are responsible. It reaches no further, and we will not permit it to be read as though it does.

Washington had already begun building the case

Let no one pretend that South Africa's standing collapsed in June. It was already collapsing, and it was collapsing entirely through choices made in Pretoria. The public record is legislative, and it is dated.


In the United States Congress, [H.R. 7256](#) was introduced on 6 February 2024. Then [H.R. 2607](#) on 2 April 2025. [H.R. 2633](#), the U.S.-South Africa Bilateral Relations Review Act, on 3 April 2025. [H.R. 4051](#) on 17 June 2025. [S. 2752](#) on 10 September 2025. [S. 2958](#) on 30 September 2025. The House Foreign Affairs Committee ordered H.R. 2633 favourably reported, as amended, on 22 July 2025.

Read what those measures actually catalogue. The Lady R at Simon's Town. Operation Mosi II. Viktor Vekselberg's money. Six Confucius Institutes. Huawei, ZTE, Hikvision. Taiwan's office downgraded. Eskom. Transnet. Cholera. State capture. Ambassador Rasool. They catalogue Pretoria's conduct in the Middle East



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as well, and we leave that dispute to the parties to it. It is not our subject and we decline to borrow it.

On 15 July 2026 the House of Representatives passed [H.R. 8595](#), the National Security, Department of State, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2027, by [217 votes to 209](#). At section 7042(c) it withholds assistance under titles III and IV for the Government of South Africa unless the Secretary of State certifies that conditions in the accompanying report have been met. Those conditions sit on page 93 of [House Report 119-631](#).

We state the position honestly, because we intend to be believed. H.R. 7256 expired with the 118th Congress. The five standalone measures introduced in the 119th Congress remain proposals. H.R. 8595 has passed one chamber and is not law. AGOA was extended through 31 December 2026 under [Public Law 119-75](#), signed on 3 February 2026, and South Africa remained eligible. We do not need to exaggerate and we will not. The point is not that sanction has landed. The point is that for more than two years a foreign legislature has been openly constructing a formal case against Pretoria, and every count on it was supplied by the ANC itself.

Now notice what is absent from that entire record. Africans. Not one count concerns an African migrant beaten in the street. Not one concerns an African child turned back from a school gate. Not one concerns a Malawian family sleeping on a pavement outside their own embassy. Two years of drafting, six standalone measures, an appropriations bill, a committee report and a roll-call vote, and the African displaced do not appear anywhere in it. Pretoria was already being called to account for its warships, its money, its cables and its ruined utilities, and no one had yet counted a single African victim.

That is the count Africa must now file, because no one else will. It is ours to bring.

Apartheid was a bureaucracy before it was a crime


The South African Institute of Race Relations maintains an [Index of Race Law](#). The Index lists 145 Acts of Parliament as formally operative. It records that nine have since been deracialised, leaving 136 non-deracialised on its own classifications. It warns that some unrepealed pre-1994 Acts marked operative are no longer enforceable under the 1993 and 1996 Constitutions. It states that it is under continuous development and should at no point be regarded as comprehensive. Its published research places the low point at 52 operative racial statutes in 1996 and the apartheid-era peak at 123 in 1980. We adopt every one of those qualifications rather than hide them. We are not required to overstate a number that is already this disturbing.

Two years after Nelson Mandela took office, the statute book was cleaner of racial classification than at any point in a century. Since that low point, the count has climbed again under the party that promised to dismantle apartheid's racial order.



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The defence is known to us and we will meet it rather than pretend it does not exist. Post-1994 racial classification, it is said, is remedial. It exists to repair the damage apartheid did, not to reproduce it. The purpose is the opposite purpose. We accept that the stated intention differs, and we accept that the difference is real. We do not accept what is claimed to follow from it. Intention does not change what a machine is. Apartheid was a bureaucracy before it was a crime. It required a clerk, a form, a category and a queue, and a state willing to attach legal consequence to descent. That apparatus was dismantled once, at enormous cost, by people who understood exactly what it was. It has been rebuilt. A government that has spent thirty years restoring the administrative practice of assigning legal consequence by racial descent cannot be surprised when Africans decline to accept its instruction on human dignity.

And the sorting is no longer only by race. It is now by nationality and by accent and by the shape of a name. Documents demanded at hospital gates. Nationality checked before treatment. Children questioned at school entrances.

What we allege, and what we do not

Precision is the only weapon we need. Imprecision is the only defence Pretoria has left. So we will separate three things the ANC-led government would very much prefer to see merged.

The first is lawful immigration enforcement. Every sovereign state controls entry to its territory. South Africa may remove persons unlawfully present, acting through authorised officials, under statutory procedure, with individual assessment and a right of review. The Mthwakazi Republic Party does not challenge that power and will not pretend to. A statement that did could be answered in a single sentence, and would deserve to be.

The second is unlawful removal, and departure coerced by conditions the state permitted. Asylum seekers with live claims. Permit holders swept up before they can produce documents. Persons removed without individual assessment. Persons displaced in breach of non-refoulement. Children separated from parents. None of that is immigration enforcement. It is the failure of it, and it is unlawful under South Africa's own statute and its own Constitution long before any international instrument is reached.

The third is private enforcement. Men who hold no office demanding documents at hospital gates. Movements deciding who may enter a school. Crowds filming the humiliation of African civilians and rewarded with reach for it. That is not enforcement at all. It is vigilantism with a pretext, and much of the conduct involved is already criminal under South African law.


Our charge concerns the second and the third. It has never concerned the first, and no honest reading of this statement can pretend otherwise.

Pretoria's own briefing



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On 12 July 2026 the South African Inter-Ministerial Committee [published an update](#) on its approach to migration. It is the most useful document in this dispute, and the ANC-led government wrote it. The South African definitions, processing figures, deportation figures, enforcement data and official descriptions in this section all come from that briefing. Where we set them beside Zimbabwe's return figures, we identify that record separately. We invite anyone who doubts a word of it to read the original.

Start with the definitions, because Pretoria supplied them. The briefing distinguishes deportation from repatriation. Deportation, it says, is a formal lawful process under section 34 of the Immigration Act. Repatriation, it says, refers to returning a person to their country of origin, and it adds this: in terms of international law, repatriation must strictly be voluntary. The briefing cites the 1951 Convention and its 1967 Protocol for that proposition. It then states that the repatriation process is voluntary.

That is South Africa's standard, written by South Africa, published by South Africa, applied to South Africa's own operation. We adopt it without amendment. If a departure was not voluntary, then on Pretoria's own definition it was not repatriation. Something else was happening, and Pretoria has told us which categories are available.

Now the numbers. By close of business on 11 July, the briefing reports, 53,449 foreign nationals had been processed for deportation and repatriation. More than eighty per cent of that combined deportation-and-repatriation figure was made up of Malawian nationals, followed by Zimbabweans and Mozambicans. The Temporary Repatriation Processing Centre at Musina opened on 1 July with capacity for twenty thousand people, and more than twenty thousand had already passed through it.

Now set the deportation figures from the same document beside Zimbabwe's return figures, and give Pretoria every advantage in the arithmetic. South Africa reports 15,398 deportations of all nationalities between 1 April and 30 June, and 2,801 deportations of all nationalities between 14 June and 8 July. Those two periods overlap, so they cannot properly be added. Add them anyway. Then assume, contrary to Pretoria's own breakdown, that every single deportee in both figures was Zimbabwean. The total is 18,199. Zimbabwe recorded 78,123 of its citizens returned by 7 July. Even on that deliberately absurd arithmetic, formal deportation accounts for less than a quarter of the Zimbabwean return total. The actual Zimbabwean deportation figure is necessarily lower, and Pretoria's own nationality breakdown says so. It reports 1,384 Zimbabweans deported in the whole of June, and 903 in the overlapping period from 14 June to 8 July.


Formal deportation cannot explain this exodus and cannot be made to. Most of these people were not recorded as formal deportations. Pretoria's combined reporting does not tell us which of the remainder received orders to leave and which departed without any official process, and Pretoria has not published the breakdown that would settle it.

So the central question is no longer only whether particular removals were lawful. It is what made more than a hundred thousand people leave a country in seven weeks when formal deportation accounts for only a small fraction of them.



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The same briefing supplies part of the answer, and enough evidence to require the question to be investigated. It records that groups of protesters were still conducting searches around homes and businesses suspected of housing undocumented immigrants. It calls that conduct illegal. It reiterates that immigration enforcement is the exclusive responsibility of the State and that no individual or group has authority to intimidate, threaten or unlawfully remove any person from any community. So the government knows. It has written it down. It published it.

Then it published the enforcement figures. As of 8 July: 205 cases registered, 350 persons arrested, 69 cases pending investigation, 112 on the court roll, in relation to unlawful conduct, intimidation, incitement and related offences. Three hundred and fifty arrests, against an exodus exceeding one hundred thousand people. Enforcement happened. Protection did not reliably follow. And the figures are the state's own confirmation that the unlawful conduct was real, was known, and was continuing.

And read how the briefing describes the people themselves. It says that scores of people continue to arrive at the centres to take advantage of the repatriation process. To take advantage. It says these uncoordinated arrivals are putting a strain on local communities and pose risks of health hazards. It says the government will deploy accelerated transport arrangements to clear the pavements and public spaces that are continuously occupied by these arrivals.

Clear the pavements. That is the ANC's phrase for African families sleeping outside their own embassies. The same briefing records that the Cities of eThekweni and Cape Town and the Western Cape Provincial Government provided buses for those in distress outside the embassies of Zimbabwe and Malawi. So the government knows who was on the pavement. It arranged the transport. And in the same document it calls them a strain and a health hazard. They are not a strain. They are the people this party once asked Africa to shelter.

The President said it himself


When Africans are attacked in South Africa, there is an old habit of looking abroad for whoever arranged it. The government's own record establishes the habit. On 28 May 2008, as 62 people lay dead in xenophobic violence, the South African Cabinet [stated](#) that it was too early to conclude that a third force was necessarily behind the violence. The phrase was already in circulation because the explanation was already in circulation. Eighteen years before the present exodus, the reflex was fully formed and written into the Cabinet record. Foreign orchestration is not an analysis in South Africa. It is a habit, and it is a habit of a party that has run out of answers.

The Mthwakazi Republic Party has no need of hidden hands. The government has already told the truth in a better place. On Sunday 7 June 2026 the President [addressed the nation on migration](#) from the Union Buildings. We ask that the whole address be read, because we adopt it.



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He said that only authorised government officials may act against violations of the law. He said that no other person is allowed, for example, to confront someone in the street to demand proof of nationality. He said there is no space for xenophobia, racism, sexism, Afrophobia or any other form of intolerance in South Africa. He said the government would act against forces exploiting the concerns of the people to further their own political, personal or criminal agendas. He said the government would not be fooled or influenced by social media campaigns spreading misinformation, fake news and lies about foreign nationals. He said that illegal immigration is not the cause of all South Africa's economic challenges. He said that South Africa is a better country for migration.

The following day, in [his weekly letter](#), he supplied the qualifications his own crackdown had omitted. Foreign nationals account for only a very small proportion of public-service users. The overwhelming majority have no involvement in crime. Both statements appeared in his own name, within a single weekend.

We do not dispute a word of it. That is precisely our point. The Mthwakazi Republic Party is not here to argue with the President of South Africa about principle. We are here to ask why the rule did not reliably reach the street.

Because five weeks later his own Inter-Ministerial Committee reported that groups of protesters were still conducting searches around homes and businesses, and called that conduct illegal. Two hundred and five cases had been registered and three hundred and fifty people arrested. More than a hundred thousand had gone.

That is the case, and the ANC-led government wrote every page of it. On 7 June the President stated the rule. On 8 June he dismantled the service-and-crime pretexts. On 12 July his own committee confirmed that the rule was still being broken while the exodus continued. A government that states the correct principle twice, in the President's own name, on national television and in writing, and then presides over one of the largest movements of Africans out of South Africa in the democratic era, did not fail to understand the problem. It understood it perfectly. By 7 July, tens of thousands had been recorded as returning independently. The published figures do not reveal how many left before or after the President's letter, or how many had received orders. But from 8 June onward the government could no longer plead ignorance of the service-and-crime falsehoods, or of the danger facing the people those falsehoods were used to hunt. That is not failure. It is knowledge.

The questions for the courts


South Africa is a State Party to the [Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court](#). It signed. It ratified. It legislated the Statute into domestic law. We take it at its word.

Article 7(1)(d) lists deportation or forcible transfer of population as a crime against humanity. For that offence the persons concerned must have been lawfully present in the area from which they were displaced, and the displacement must have occurred without grounds permitted under international law. Article 7(1)(h) lists



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persecution against an identifiable group on political, racial, national or ethnic grounds, and additionally requires the intentional and severe deprivation of fundamental rights because of group identity, in connection with another act referred to in Article 7 or another crime within the Court's jurisdiction. Both require that the conduct form part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population, pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organisational policy, and with knowledge of the attack. One point is settled and it governs everything here. The Court's [Elements of Crimes](#) provide that the term forcibly is not restricted to physical force, and may include coercion caused by fear of violence, duress, detention, psychological oppression or abuse of power.

There is one further matter of record, and it is South Africa's own Constitutional Court. On 7 July 2026, in [Scalabrini Centre of Cape Town and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Others](#) (CCT 126/25), a unanimous Court confirmed that sections 4(1)(f), 4(1)(h), 4(1)(i) and 21(1B) of the Refugees Act 130 of 1998 are inconsistent with the Constitution and invalid. The section 4 provisions operated as procedural filters, disqualifying asylum seekers from refugee status for immigration-related procedural non-compliance before any assessment of the merits of their claims. The Court held that this is inconsistent with the principle of non-refoulement, which protects a person against return to a country where they may face persecution or serious harm unless and until the claim has been finally rejected after a proper merits-based process, and which applies before formal recognition as a refugee, because a person may in substance be a refugee before that status is determined. Procedural non-compliance, the Court held, even where serious, cannot justify disbarment from the asylum system without a merits-based assessment. Section 21(1B) failed separately, as vague and permitting an arbitrary exercise of public power. The Court further found that where a child's claim is tied to a parent's, the child may be excluded from the asylum system because of the parent's procedural non-compliance, without individual assessment and without regard to the child's best interests, contrary to section 28 of the Constitution. No suspension of the declaration of invalidity was sought, and none was granted.

Note the date. The judgment was delivered on 7 July 2026, the same day Zimbabwe's Cabinet reported 78,123 of its citizens returned, and five days before the Inter-Ministerial Committee published its briefing.


Note also what the judgment recorded. At the hearing on 12 February 2026, more than three months before the exodus began, the State's counsel advanced sweeping and unsupported assertions about the involvement of Afghani and Bangladeshi nationals in human trafficking in South Africa. The Court held that those assertions lacked an evidentiary foundation, undermined the integrity of the State's case, and risked promoting prejudicial narratives about refugees and asylum seekers. It described the conduct as deserving of strong deprecation. It ordered the respondents to pay the applicants' costs, and observed that the State had litigated poorly.

We will not pretend that counsel spoke during the exodus. They spoke in February. That is the point, and it is a heavier one. The prejudicial narrative about foreign nationals was already being advanced by the State's own lawyers, in the Constitutional Court, before the first bus left. And while more than a hundred thousand



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people were leaving, South Africa's highest court was publishing the judgment that recorded it. The Court invalidated the three section 4 provisions because their disqualification regime violated non-refoulement, and invalidated section 21(1B) separately because it was vague and permitted an arbitrary exercise of public power. This is not the Mthwakazi Republic Party's characterisation of the ANC-led government. We did not invent the legal failure. South Africa's highest court identified it.

The Mthwakazi Republic Party does not allege a verdict and does not pretend to one. We allege a question, and we insist that it be asked. Where persons lawfully present are displaced without individual assessment, where asylum claims go unadjudicated, where non-refoulement is breached, or where organised coercion is knowingly permitted to accomplish displacement that lawful process would not authorise, the facts warrant examination under Article 7(1)(d) and Article 7(1)(h). Whether the widespread-or-systematic threshold, the policy element and the required knowledge can be established is a matter for competent investigators and courts. It is not a matter for us, and it is certainly not a matter for the government under examination.

We therefore call on the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, the African Union Commission, and the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court to open that examination now, while the witnesses are alive and while the conduct is still being recorded on the telephones of the men carrying it out.

Protection did not reach the clinic door

On 4 November 2025 the Gauteng High Court [interdicted specified practices of Operation Dudula](#), including the demanding of identity documents and interference with access to health care and schools. We will be exact, because exactness is what makes this unanswerable. The Court did not outlaw the organisation. It rejected a pleaded allegation of collusion involving the police and Home Affairs for want of credible evidence. We do not allege what a court has already rejected.


So we will state what the order establishes, and then state separately the conclusion we draw. The order establishes that private actors were engaged in conduct serious enough to require judicial restraint. It establishes nothing about conspiracy with the state, and neither do we. The conclusion is ours and we take responsibility for it. Not conspiracy. Abdication. The government's words recognised the danger. Its protection did not reliably reach the clinic door.

The government's own briefing supplies more. Lawyers for Human Rights went to court demanding urgent intervention, protection measures, and disclosure of the state's plans to prevent xenophobic violence associated with the 30 June ultimatum. The briefing records the outcome. The Court dismissed the urgency in Part A, and Part B was postponed *sine die*. A human rights organisation asked the state to produce a plan to protect people from a publicly announced ultimatum, and the matter was found not urgent. By the time 30 June arrived the exodus was already underway. The date passed, the departures continued, and the reported total climbed beyond one hundred thousand.



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This is not new and it is not foreign. In 2008, xenophobic violence in South Africa left [62 people killed and at least 100.000 displaced](#). Eighteen years later the violence has the same shape, better logistics and a distribution network. Mobs organise online, publish their raids, and are rewarded with audience. The humiliation of vulnerable African civilians has become content. It is filmed, uploaded and monetised while the people inside the footage are stripped of everything a person has.

Max Weber described the state as the body that successfully claims a monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force within a territory. That is a definition of the state, not a legal test of failure, and we will not pretend otherwise. But where private movements openly perform immigration enforcement while police protection arrives inconsistently or only after litigation, the state has surrendered part of its most basic responsibility. By some definitions, that is where state failure begins. By any definition, it is where a person's safety ends.

Beitbridge

Our people are among those at the border post, and they are not the largest group. This was a continental exodus, not a Mthwakazi grievance alone. Malawi, Mozambique, Lesotho, Kenya, Nigeria, Uganda, the Republic of Congo. We say that first because a party that counts only its own dead has no standing to lecture anyone about solidarity.

The Matabele nation went south because Zimbabwe made Matabeleland unlivable. Gukurahundi murdered our grandparents and scattered the survivors. Zanu-PF's misrule finished what the Fifth Brigade started, destroying the economy that might have kept the survivors home. Our people crossed the Limpopo carrying that history. They built South African houses, cleaned South African hospitals, mined South African platinum, raised South African children, and paid into a system that has now driven them out.

Zimbabwe's repatriation programme began on 28 May 2026. At the Cabinet briefing of 7 July, the Minister of Information reported 21,291 citizens returned through government-assisted arrangements and a further 56,832 recorded as returning independently through self-repatriation, a total of 78,123. At the signing of the Joint Resource Mobilisation Plan on 16 July, officials reported more than 33,000 facilitated returns through Beitbridge and roughly 70,000 independent ones. The reported total had exceeded a hundred thousand people in seven weeks. The number requires no embellishment.


Now the correction Pretoria will reach for, which we will make first and make ourselves. There is a reception centre at Beitbridge and it is functioning. Temporary accommodation. A temporary clinic with ambulances. Mobile ablutions. Hot meals and blankets. Registration, screening and psychosocial support. A twenty-four-hour inter-ministerial command centre, and fifty ZUPCO buses to carry people onward. We say so because it is true, and because we will not build a case on a claim that a photograph can destroy.

A tent is not a house. A transit clinic is not continuing care. A bus is not a livelihood. These are emergency measures at a point of arrival and were never designed to be more. The United Nations Resident



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Coordinator went to Beitbridge this month and said as much: the real challenge begins when people return to their communities, where they must find work, reach services, enrol children in school and rebuild a sense of belonging. Reintegration, she said, is not only a humanitarian issue but a development imperative. That is the United Nations describing this in the language of decades.

Then ask who is paying for the decades. The buses are Zimbabwean. The programme is Harare's. The ambulances were donated by the Higherlife Foundation and the Life Foundation. The food and blankets came from the World Food Programme, UNICEF and the Adventist Development and Relief Agency. Zimbabwe and the United Nations have now signed a Joint Resource Mobilisation Plan to fund what comes next.

We will be exact about this too. Pretoria is not spending nothing. Its own briefing says the state is funding most of the repatriation and deportation operations on its side of the border, including transport, security and accommodation, and it calls those measures costly to the fiscus. It also says, in the same document, that it is now in discussion about scaling them down. What the record does not show is any South African contribution to the reception and reintegration costs being carried inside Zimbabwe. South Africa pays to move people to the border and calls the bill temporary. Everything after the border is somebody else's problem, and the somebody is Zimbabwean taxpayers, United Nations agencies, foundations and private charity. That is the charge. Not that South Africa spent nothing. That South Africa has externalised the downstream cost of what happened on its own soil, and is winding down even the part it agreed to carry.

Now the category that matters most, and it is the one nobody is examining. Of the 78,123 counted on 7 July, 56,832 were recorded by Zimbabwe as having returned independently through self-repatriation mechanisms. They were not in Harare's assisted count. We are careful about what that classification means, because carelessness would cost us the argument and we intend to keep it. It records how those people travelled home. It does not tell us whether any of them had received a removal order, travelled privately after official processing, or simply fled without ever encountering an official at all. South Africa's published figure combines deportations and repatriations and supplies no complete breakdown between the two.


So note who could resolve part of this and has not. South Africa alone holds the records that can identify who was formally deported, who was processed through assisted repatriation, and who was issued an order to leave. It has published some deportation totals and some nationality breakdowns, but its headline processing figure remains combined, and it has published no complete month-by-month table separating the categories. Publishing that table would not determine who was coerced into leaving. It would remove the avoidable ambiguity about official action, and leave the rest to witnesses and investigators. That is why it is the first thing we demand.

On the paperwork, they returned independently. The legal question is whether the choice was real. Reporting from the reception centre records returnees describing being assaulted, robbed and driven from their homes and their jobs. A departure is not voluntary merely because no official put you on the bus. Where exclusion



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from hospitals, vigilante raids, threats, dismissal and fear make staying impossible, independent return describes the paperwork and not the decision.

More than a hundred thousand people crossed out of South Africa in seven weeks, most through channels classified as independent. The classification records how they travelled. It does not answer whether they were free to stay.

The facilities do different work and we will not conflate them. Beitbridge is in Zimbabwe. It proves the scale of the arrival and the cost of it, and it proves nothing whatever about Pretoria's intentions. Musina is inside South Africa. It is a state-run temporary centre, opened on 1 July with capacity for twenty thousand people, processing undocumented foreign nationals for deportation and repatriation, including people returning to Malawi, Zimbabwe and Mozambique. Beyond Musina, Ghana, Nigeria, Malawi and other African governments organised separate flights and assisted-return programmes for their citizens. The movement is organised, administered and continental in scale. Whether it also satisfies the policy element of a crime against humanity is precisely the question we ask to have investigated, and precisely the question the ANC-led government would prefer nobody put.

People have died in the course of this movement. The briefing records the death of Mr. Kassim Jaffati, a Malawian national born on 5 May 1979, who died on his way home just before his bus reached Beitbridge and was returned to the centre. An inquest is proceeding. A Zimbabwean bus driver, identified in the briefing only as Morris, died on the N1, and a culpable homicide case was opened. The government notes, for the record, that the bus was not commissioned by it. We record the deaths because the pavement-clearing language does not.

For every person formally removed, the consequences were foreseeable when the decision was made. For every person driven out by conditions the government knew of and failed to control, the same question arises with greater force, because by then the President had already said the rule and written down that the premise was false. Pretoria could see what waited beyond the Limpopo. It proceeded anyway.

We hold Zanu-PF responsible for creating the refugee. We hold the ANC responsible for what is being done to that refugee now. Both charges stand. Neither cancels the other.

The credibility is gone


South Africa has presented itself for thirty years as the voice of the oppressed. It cannot hold that position and this conduct at the same time. A government under whose watch more than one hundred thousand Africans left in seven weeks, while mobs operated at clinic doors and racial classification remained embedded in statute, is not a witness against oppression. It has a case to answer.

Pretoria stood before the International Court of Justice and asked the world to judge a distant state by the cumulative weight of its conduct toward a civilian population. Statements. Patterns. Omissions. Scale. That



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was South Africa's own submitted method, argued at length, on its own initiative. It is now public property. We do not ask the world to abandon that method. We ask that Africans be permitted to apply it, and to apply it here. Pretoria cannot demand cumulative assessment abroad and refuse cumulative assessment at home. A government that finds its voice for civilians four thousand miles away and loses it for civilians on the pavement outside the Malawian embassy has not made a moral choice. It has made a selection, and Africa can see it.

This has broken something larger than Pretoria's reputation. It has broken pan-African solidarity, which was the ANC's only remaining asset. Every African state watching the Limpopo now understands that South African solidarity was conditional on the African in question staying on the far side of the fence. Our continent extended shelter to the ANC in exile for decades. Zambia. Tanzania. Angola. Mozambique. Zimbabwe. The ANC survived because Africa sheltered it. Its government now calls the grandchildren of the people who sheltered it a strain on local communities. Africa has noticed, and Africa will remember longer than the ANC expects.

What we demand

We reject the general isolation of South Africa. It would fall on the people this statement has just absolved. We equally reject identification without consequence, which is the oldest way of doing nothing slowly. The formula is not complicated. Identify the responsible actors. Then isolate the actors identified.

The Mthwakazi Republic Party calls for the identification and targeted diplomatic, economic and reputational isolation of the ANC officials, government officials, state institutions and organised movements responsible for unlawful removals, the denial of essential services, persecution, or the tolerated exercise of immigration powers by private actors. Those responsible must face consequences until the conduct stops, lawful safeguards are restored and victims receive redress. Those consequences must not punish ordinary South Africans or obstruct humanitarian assistance.


Specifically, we demand:

- Immediate publication by South Africa of a complete breakdown separating formal deportations under section 34 of the Immigration Act from assisted repatriations, by nationality and by month, together with the criteria by which any departure was classified as voluntary.
- An immediate moratorium on collective or accelerated removals that have not demonstrably been preceded by individual assessment, determination of live asylum claims, a meaningful opportunity for review, and compliance with non-refoulement, and full and immediate implementation of the Constitutional Court's judgment in *Scalabrini Centre of Cape Town and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Others*.
- An effective guarantee and enforcement of access to emergency health care and schooling for every child inside South Africa, regardless of nationality or documentation. The legal entitlement already



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exists. The enforcement of it is what has failed.

- An enforceable prohibition on private immigration enforcement, full compliance with the order of the Gauteng High Court of 4 November 2025, and investigation and, where the evidence establishes an offence, prosecution of those who assaulted, robbed, unlawfully detained, intimidated or obstructed African civilians under colour of an authority they never held.
- Formal examination of the removal programme and of the conditions producing coerced departure, by the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, the African Union Commission, and the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, against Article 7(1)(d) and Article 7(1)(h) of the Rome Statute.
- The identification, on the basis of credible evidence, of every senior official and political leader responsible for directing, facilitating or knowingly permitting unlawful removals or systematic abuses against African migrants, followed where the applicable legal criteria are met by targeted visa restrictions, asset measures and other individual sanctions.
- Review of the eligibility of South African officials to hold leadership or representative positions within African Union human rights bodies while their government is under formal examination for these acts.
- A full accounting of the downstream reception and reintegration costs, and a contribution toward them from South Africa proportionate to the conduct and failures found to have contributed to the exodus.
- Reparation to those unlawfully removed, coerced into departure, assaulted, robbed, denied essential care, or otherwise subjected to legally compensable harm, funded by the state or the private actor legally responsible for it.

This is not a novel mechanism and we do not present it as one. Section 6 of [H.R. 2633 as introduced](#) already requires the identification of senior South African officials and ANC leaders whose corruption or human rights abuses could satisfy Global Magnitsky criteria, together with the supporting evidence and either an anticipated timetable for sanctions or the reasons for declining to impose them. That bill is a proposal. It authorises nothing against anyone today, and we do not pretend that it does. We cite it as an existing model of the correct sequence. Evidence, identification, explanation, consequence. Africa should not need an American legislative proposal to teach it that sequence, and it is a judgment on the ANC that we are reduced to citing one.

Identification is the evidentiary act. Targeted isolation is the consequence. Ordinary South Africans are not the target, and any measure that makes them the target is a measure we oppose.


What we will do

The Mthwakazi Republic Party will do everything within its capacity for the people South Africa has driven out, and not only for our own. We will document them, count them, and with their informed consent name



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them, because the first thing done to a displaced person is that they are turned into a number, and the second thing is that they are turned into a strain on local communities. Nobody will be named who does not ask to be. We will assist them at Beitbridge and beyond with what we have, and we will demand more from those who have more. We will carry their cases to every forum that will hear us, and to the ones that would rather not. We will not let the file close.

And we will govern differently. That is the entire point of Mthwakazi. We have watched what liberation movements become when they mistake their history for a permanent licence. Zanu-PF did it to us with the Fifth Brigade and then instructed us to be grateful for independence. The ANC is doing it now while telling the world it is the conscience of the oppressed. We reject the model itself, not merely its current custodians. A Mthwakazi state will not assign legal consequence by descent. It will not measure a person's worth by the flag on their document. It will not hunt the poor to distract from its own failures, because it will not build a state whose last remaining product is a scapegoat.

We were driven out. We know precisely what it costs, in the body and in the years afterward. Any liberation movement or government carrying that memory that then does it to somebody else has learned nothing and deserves nothing. From us it will get one thing only. The truth, repeated, until it stops.

Issued by the Office of the President.


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


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Matabeleland demands justice, fairness, and recognition. Enough is enough.

Sisonke Sibambene SinguMthwakazi Sesikulungisa!

